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Unfortunately, the most newsworthy aspect of detention centers in Latin
America is their propensity to explode into horrendous violence: fires, uprisings
(or riots) that claim the lives of dozens of detainees, and clashes between rival
gangs or organized criminal groups, and mass escapes. Several thousand have
perished in prison violence in Latin America in the past few decades—a single
incident at the Comayagua Prison claimed the lives of 362 inmates in Honduras
in February 2012. 1 The underlying conditions that give rise to these collective
acts of violence are well known and studied. Scholars have assessed the
relationship between severe overcrowding, limited resources and poor services,
and self-rule by detainees. 2 Such self-rule is aggravated by high levels of
violence and illicit markets within prisons. 3 The combination is highly volatile
and poses grave dangers to the lives and wellbeing of detainees, authorities, and
often the larger society beyond prisons. Prison administration, and the
corresponding literature on detention centers, mainly addresses the battle for
control within detention centers. Study of informal organizations in prisons in
Latin America focuses on the exercise of control over daily life inside detention
centers, including the extreme example of “self-rule by inmates.” 4
Unfortunately, the primary alternative to self-rule by detainees has been an
authoritarian model in which prison officials control all aspects of inmates’ lives,

1. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H. R., REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE SITUATION OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY IN HONDURAS 1 (2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/docs/pdf/HONDURAS-PPL-2013ENG.pdf.
2. LUCÍA DAMMERT & LIZA ZÚÑIGA, LA CÁRCEL: PROBLEMAS Y DESAFÍOS PARA LAS
AMÉRICAS, 3 (2008); Elías Carranza, La Política Criminal en América Latina, in MINISTERIO DE
JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA PENITENCIARIA: EN EL
MARCO DE UN GOBIERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 200–201, 205 (2012).
3. JONATHAN D. ROSEN & MARTEN W. BRIENEN, PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HUMAN DUMPING GROUND, IX-XI (2016); Sacha Darke & Chris
Garces, Surviving in the New Mass Carceral Zone, PRISON SERV. J., 2, 4, 6 (2017).
4. See generally JOSÉ RICARDO RAMALHO, MUNDO DO CRIME: A ORDEM PELO AVESSO
(2008); JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES: UNA ETNOGRAFÍA DEL PENAL DE
LURIGANCHO (1994) (Peru) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES]; JOSÉ LUIS
PÉREZ GUADALUPE, ‘DE FLAITES A COCODRILOS:’ EL CAMBIO GENERACIONAL DE LA
DELINCUENCIA CHILENA (1995) (tesis de licenciatura en sociología, ILADES, Pontificia
Universidad Gregoriana de Roma) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, ‘DE FLAITES A COCODRILOS’];
JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, NUEVAS DROGAS, NUEVOS DELICUENTES (1998) (tesis de master
en criminología, San Sebastián: Instituto Vasco de Criminología) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE,
NUEVAS DROGAS]; JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA REALIDAD
CARCELARIA (2000) [hereinafter PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL]; JUAN CARLOS
PINTO QUINTANILLA, CÁRCEL DE SAN PEDRO: RADIOGRAFÍA DE LA INJUSTICIA (1995); David
Skarbek, Covenants Without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally, 110 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 845, 852 (2016); Andrés Antillano, When Prisoners Make the Prison. Self-Rule in
Venezuelan Prisons, PRISON SERV. J., 26, 26 (2017).
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often through isolation, draconian policies, and violence. 5 Until recently, prison
administration in Peru, the country that provides the main case study for this
article, has alternated between these extreme and dysfunctional models. 6 This
article considers a novel approach to managing volatile detention centers applied
in Peru for a decade (2011–2020) with promising results and we contend, the
potential to transform prisons in Latin America.
In the 1980s, the National Penitentiary Institute of Peru–Instituto Nacional
Penitenciario del Perú, INPE–largely abandoned its function as administrator
of detention centers, leaving the National Police in charge. 7 The National Police,
of course, was an institution without specialized training in prison management.
The result was informal organization by prisoners and the development of a
system of entirely autonomous self-rule by inmates. 8 The most emblematic case
was the Lurigancho Penitentiary (the largest prison in the country), in which the
detainees established their own fully functional internal organization, while the
police limited themselves to external control of the prison. 9 The prisoners at
Lurigancho quite literally held the keys to the jail. 10 They controlled entrance
and exit from cells and cellblocks, decided which people and products could
circulate, and imposed their own internal norms. In addition, to protect
cellblocks from attacks by other detainees, prisoners maintained stocks of
knives, firearms of various types, spears and even hand grenades. 11
Beginning in 2002, INPE began to retake control of prisons, but self-rule
continued. In 2008, a report by National Geographic identified Lurigancho as
5. De Dardel, Julie & Söderström, Ola, The Rise and Fall of Supermax: How the US Prison
Model and Ultra-punitive Penal Policy Travelled to Colombia 15 (Maison d’analyze des Processus
Sociaux, Université de Neuchatel, Working paper 3-2015/E, 2015).
6. Stephen Nathan, El sistema penitenciario: Modelo de gestión privada o pública, in
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA
PENITENCIARIA EN EL MARCO DE UN GOBERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 295, 309 (2012).
Many of the observations about detention centers in Latin America are based on the personal
observations of the three authors. Pérez Guadalupe has worked in the prison system for civil society
organizations and later for the state for three decades; he has also visited and studied conditions in
detention centers across Latin America. See, e.g., JOSÉ LUIS PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA REALIDAD CARCELARIA (Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia
Universidad Católica del Perú, 2000) (assessing, based on months of research in detention centers
themselves, the social organization of prisons in Perú, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia);
Cavallaro has documented conditions in prisons for Human Rights Watch, Justiça Global (Brazil)
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a quarter century; he has visited scores
of detention centers across the Americas and has published books and articles on prison conditions
and the social structures in prisons. Lucía Nuñovero Cisneros worked between 2005 and 2011 in
human rights projects in the Santa Mónica, and Callao Penitentiaries. From 2012 to 2013, she
advised the Ministry of Justice of Peru on Penitentiary Policy.
7. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 1.
8. PEREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 170–223.
9. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 109–10.
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one of the most dangerous prisons in the world, emphasizing how detainees
exercised control and established internal rules. 12 This same situation of selfrule, or self-rule by inmates, was primarily the norm in most of Peru’s
penitentiaries. 13
In this context, the Peruvian Prison Reform Process began in 2011. At the
time, Peru faced the same problems that characterize detention centers in Latin
America: shortage of staff and budget, inadequate infrastructure, and high levels
of overcrowding (resulting from increases in violent crime). INPE managed to
achieve institutional reorganization and restored internal order in prisons,
eliminating riots, shootings, hostage taking incidents and hunger strikes. The
reform process also reduced the number of violent deaths and escapes. More
than anything, though, the reform process served to break the grip that Peruvian
criminal groups exercised inside prisons. As data collected for this article
shows, while prison overcrowding has increased and street crime has become
more violent and lethal, prisons in Peru remain considerably less violent than in
the past.
This article seeks to present and explain this reform process and to draw
lessons from its success. To do so, we begin by contextualizing the challenges
of detention centers in Latin America. We summarize the major elements of the
Prison Reform Process launched in Peru in 2011, which included the design and
construction of maximum-security centers, efforts to attack corruption, and a
restructuring of the prison guard service. That said, the most important aspect
of the Reform Process was the “incorporation” of the informal organization by
inmates themselves as a key element of a sustained policy of Management by
Dialogue (gestión dialogada). We believe that this practice was central in the
process of reestablishing authority and institutional administration (Gobierno
Institucional) in detention centers across the country. The Prison Reform
Process managed to eliminate i) self-rule by inmates, and ii) institutional
authoritarianism, extreme but common elements of detention centers throughout
the Americas. 14 Finally, based on this concrete experience and the three authors’
collective understanding of detention centers in Latin America, this article ends
by proposing a new model of prison administration we call “Prison
Governance.”
I. THE CHALLENGES OF PRISON MANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America, the principal indicators of the prison problem are the
increase in prison population per capita, and the concomitant rates of
overcrowding, shown in Table 1. This problem is also related to the limited
12. World’s Toughest Prisons (National Geographic television broadcast Dec. 21, 2019).
13. PEREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 415–17.
14. Mirte Postema, James Cavallaro & Ruhan Nagra, Advancing Security and Human Rights
by the Controlled Organisation of Inmates, PRISON SERV. J., 57, 59–62 (2017) (describing case
studies in Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru).
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resources afforded penitentiary institutions and the levels of violence reported
in many Latin American detention centers. 15
Table 1: Evolution of the Penitentiary Population in Latin America, 2000–2016 16
COUNTRY
El Salvador
Paraguay
Venezuela
Ecuador
Guatemala
Peru
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Panama
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Mexico
Honduras
Chile
Argentina*
TOTAL

2000
7,754
3,219
14,196
8,029
6,974
27,734
232,755
51,518
7,575
4,469
8,652
8,151
6,539
154,765
11,500
33,050
57,632
644,512

2002
10,907
4,621
19,368
8,723
8,077
27,417
239,345
52,936
8,113
5,630
10,423
6,065
6,885
172,888
11,502
34,901
57,632
685,433

2004
12,073
6,101
19,951
11,358
8,698
31,311
336,358
68,020
8,890
6,888
11,400
6,495
6,233
193,889
10,931
36,374
65,351
840,321

2006
14,771
6,037
19,257
12,635
7,477
35,835
401,236
60,021
9,037
6,887
11,575
7,031
6,103
210,140
11,178
39,417
60,621
919,258

2008
19,814
5,867
24,069
12,067
8,158
43,286
451,429
69,979
9,682
7,665
9,651
7,433
6,803
219,754
11,390
48,826
60,611
1,016,484

2010
24,662
6,197
40,825
11,800
11,148
45,464
496,251
84,444
12,110
8,700
12,293
9,406
6,500
219,027
11,846
54,628
65,095
1,120,396

2012
27,033
7,916
45,224
21,080
15,013
58,019
548,003
113,884
14,555
9,418
14,468
14,272
9,800
239,089
12,095
51,882
66,484
1,268,235

2014-2016
36,235
12,741
49,664
25,902
20,697
79,664
622,202
120,668
17,440
9,996
17,197
14,598
10,569
233,469
17,017
42,971
69,060
1,400,070

VAR
367%
269%
250%
223%
197%
187%
167%
134%
130%
124%
99%
79%
62%
51%
48%
30%
20%
117%

The most severe situation in terms of soaring prison population can be seen in
Central America. In El Salvador, for instance, between 2000 and 2016, the rate
of incarceration increased four-fold, from 130 to 559 detainees per 100,000
inhabitants. 17 In Panama, the incarceration rate rose from 280 to 426 per
100,000 inhabitants during this same period. 18 South American states follow a
similar pattern as in Central America. The case of Brazil is worth highlighting:
its incarceration rate has nearly tripled, from 133 to 307 per 100,000 inhabitants
over the past fifteen years. 19 Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay have all
reached incarceration rates of at least 240 per 100,000. 20
Thus, the first prison administration challenge faced by Latin American states
is the increasing rate of incarceration and overcrowding, with all that such
overcrowding implies in terms of provision of services, maintenance of
15. DAMMERT & ZÚÑIGA, supra note 2, at 3; Carranza, supra note 2, at 193; ROSEN &
BRIENEN, supra note 3, ix-xi; Darke & Garces, supra note 3, at 2–3, 7.
16. World Prison Brief, UNIV. OF BIRKBECH- LONDON, https://www.prisonstudies.org/
world-prison-brief-data (Data compiled 2014–2016, including federal and provincial systems and
in some cases, detainees held in police lockups).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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infrastructure, treatment of inmates and management of internal and external
security. As we see in Table 1, the highest levels of overcrowding can be found
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela, Bolivia and Perú. 21 Studies, such as
those by Metaal and Youngers, demonstrate that this surge has resulted from an
increase in the number of those detained while facing, or after conviction for
criminal charges, often drug related offenses. Sentences for these offenses are
substantial in the Americas. 22 The problem is compounded by extensive periods
spent by thousands of detainees in pre-trial detention throughout Latin
America. 23 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has documented
the high percentage of detainees awaiting trial in the Americas. While the figure
across the region is over thirty-six percent, in some countries the percentage of
those held prior to conviction or acquittal has surpassed seventy-five percent. 24
The combination of long sentences and pre-trial detention has led to vast
overcrowding, which in turn has generated high levels of violence and conflict
inside detention centers. 25 This is particularly the case in those prisons in which
groups of detainees have developed self-governance structures that allow them
to impose their will on other inmates and authorities. 26

21. See id.
22. Metaal, Pien & Youngers Coletta, Sistemas Sobrecargados. Leyes de Drogas y Cárceles
en América Latina, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTO & WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA at
5 (2010); Irrational Punishment: Drug Laws and incarceration in Latin America, in THE
RESEARCH CONSORTIUM ON DRUGS AND THE LAW 3 (Sergio Chaparro, Catalina Pérez, & Coletta
Youngers eds. 2017); Marcelo Bergman & Elena Azaola, Cárceles de México: Cuadros de una
Crisis, 1 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE SEGURIDAD CIUDADANA 74, 74 (2007); Lucía
Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento de la Población Penitenciaria en el Perú, Medidas
Alternativas y Vigilancia Electrónica, 37 ESTUDIOS PENALES Y CRIMINOLÓGICOS 349, 380 (2017).
23. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H. R., REPORT ON MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE USE OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE AMERICAS 22, 22, n.12 (2017), http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/reports/pdfs/PretrialDetention.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 21, n.2.
26. ROSEN & BRIENEN, supra note 3, at ix; Darke & Garces, supra note 3, at 5–7.
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Graph 1: Prison Overcrowding in Latin American Countries, 2017 27
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Despite its prevalence, violence in Latin American detention centers, or more
precisely the dynamics of this violence, has not been the subject of sufficient
academic study. Literature from other regions indicates that the levels of
violence among inmates and collective violence may be measured by looking to
the number of violent incidents in detention centers. 28 Figures on violent deaths,
riots, and disturbances suggest failures in governance and show a relationship to
the excessive use of force and recidivism. 29
In this regard, the prisons issue in the majority of Latin American states,
including Peru, has generally been understood from a perspective that
foregrounds resource scarcity and the perceived need to invest in prison
infrastructure. 30 The structural deficit, though, has been accompanied by
problems of prison administration, widespread corruption, the proliferation of
drug and weapons markets within detention centers, deficient provision of food
and health services, as well as high levels of pretrial detention. 31 These are

27. World Prison Brief, UNIV. OF BIRKBECH- LONDON, https://www.prisonstudies.org/
world-prison-brief-data (Data compiled 2014–2016, including federal and provincial systems and
in some cases, detainees held in police lockups).
28. Benjamin Steiner & John Wooldredge, Rethinking the Link Between Institutional
Crowding and Inmate Misconduct, 89 PRISON J. 205, 218 (2009).
29. See Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced Assessment of
Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 242 (2006).
30. Stephen Nathan, El Sistema Penitenciario: Modelo de Gestión Privada o Pública, in
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: POLÍTICA CRIMINAL Y REFORMA
PENITENCIARIA EN EL MARCO DE UN GOBERNO DEMOCRÁTICO E INCLUSIVO 295, 296–97 (2012);
Lucia Nuñovero Cisneros, Quel Avenir Pour les Mesures Alternatives à L’Incarcération dans la
Démarche Politico-Criminelle Péruvienne?, 35 ARCHIVES DE POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE 243, 245,
247–48 (2013).
31. Darke & Garcés, supra note 3, at 2, 4, 6; IBÁN DE REMENTERÍA, LAS DROGAS DE LOS
DETENIDOS (2016); Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, General Trends of Prisons in the
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fundamental aspects of prison administration that have been given insufficient
attention in the existing literature. Still, studies have not only described the
informal organization of detainees––and their ability to oppose institutional
control––but have also demonstrated the relationship between unfair and
coercive prison administration and inmate violence. 32 In sum, the problems of
Latin American prisons go far beyond lack of infrastructure.
II. FROM SELF-ORGANIZATION TO SELF-RULE BY INMATES
To begin, we should differentiate between informal organization and selforganization of inmates, present in the vast majority of “total institutions” such
as prisons, 33 and “self-rule”––or “self-government”––by inmates, which occurs
when a given detention center permits or is unable to stop detainees from seizing
control of the prison. What, we may ask, leads informal organization of inmates
to devolve into self-rule by inmates? To respond to this question, we must first
identify the principal actors in prison life—staff and detainees—and analyze the
role of each in this process.
In prisons with large numbers of inmates with ties to criminal subcultures––
major gangs such as the Central American maras, criminal syndicates such as
drug trafficking cartels, etc.––one would expect that these groups would seek to
impose their own rules and norms of co-existence inside the detention center.
Common sense tells us that when prisons are overcrowded, with insufficient
prison staff, poor infrastructure and limited resources, the consolidation of “selfrule” by inmates is more likely. 34
One thus finds two forces––formal authorities and organized groups of
inmates––in direct conflict within the detention center, each seeking the same
objective: control of the prison. Strong, efficient penitentiary institutions are
more able to contain the efforts of “delinquent inmates” to control the prison. 35
These inmates and their prison culture can be neutralized with intelligent and
adequately resourced prison administration. That is, the development of “selfrule by inmates” does not depend solely on detainees themselves, but also on the
capacity and will of prison authorities. If control of detention centers is not a
public security priority––as, unfortunately, is often the case––and if staff are not
subject to a functioning system of incentives and disincentives, then they may
Americas, in PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6-10 (Jonathan D. Rosen
and Marten W. Brienen eds., 2015).
32. See BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971–1986
92–97 (1991); MARK COLVIN, THE PENITENTIARY IN CRISIS: FROM ACCOMMODATION TO RIOT
IN NEW MEXICO 193205 (1992); Benjamin Steiner, H. Daniel Butler & Jared M. Ellison, Causes
and Correlates of Prison Inmate Misconduct: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 42 J. CRIM.
JUST. 462, 464 (2014).
33. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3–5 (1961).
34. Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 9.
35. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, 168–69.

Fall 2021]

Towards a Governance Model of Ungovernable Prisons

375

abandon their work within the prison. 36 That is, absent the appropriate
incentives, staff will be less likely to risk their lives to enforce administration
policies. Further, they may receive benefits in exchange for their complicity or
assistance with the order established by prison leaders.
Later in this article, when we turn to “Prison Governance” we will consider
concrete cases in which one finds all the elements that ordinarily lead to selfrule by inmates but in which the prison authorities have been able to maintain
control. In these concrete cases, as we explain, seizure of control and
implementation of self-rule by inmates have been avoided through dialogue and
co-responsibility of the actors involved, as well as the incorporation of the selforganization mechanisms of inmates. 37
A. Inmate Organizations: What We Know From the Literature
In this regard, numerous American criminology studies of the informal
organization of detainees and “prison subcultures,” dating back to the 1930s,
provide context to understand how these subcultures affect different models of
prison administration proposed by experts. One of the first studies, by Donald
Clemmer, published in 1941, described the existence of a strong, informal
organization of inmates in American prisons. 38 Clemmer observed among
prisoners their own system of values and norms, as well as their ability to resist
institutional objectives. 39 Subsequent studies have highlighted the codes and
language of inmates. 40
Clemmer termed the process by which detainees adopt the customs, rules and
tactics of prison life on entering detention centers as “prisonization.” 41 Prison
culture arises from the values and behavior in the detention context, focusing in
particular on the conditions of deprivation of liberty, the structures and logic of
prison, the relationships that these foster and detainees’ lack of autonomy. 42 In
the Latin American context, Pérez Guadalupe has demonstrated that

36. Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 8; PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES
supra note 4, at 3.
37. See infra Sec. III.
38. DONALD CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY 299 (1958).
39. Id. Pérez Guadalupe draws a distinction between “delinquent inmates” and “nondelinquent inmates,” based not on the legal classification of a particular detainee but rather on that
individual’s belonging or not to the so-called world of criminality. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 60–61. By this, he refers to the criminal careers and
participation in criminal subcultures. Pérez Guadalupe also works with the category of
“sociocultural delinquent.” Id. at 64–65.
40. Gresham M. Sykes & Sheldon L. Messinger, The Inmate Social System, in SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, 15 THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
PRISON 5, 5 (1960).
41. Donald Clemmer, Observations on Imprisonment as a Source of Criminality, 41 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 315 (1950).
42. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 419.
Y ATORRANTES,
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prisonization is not the only process that occurs within jails and penitentiaries. 43
Pérez Guadalupe has explained that those deprived of liberty come to prison
with cultural practices and identities developed before incarceration. 44 He terms
the process by which the cultures from outside the prison interact with the
detention center as presonización, from the Spanish term preso or prisoner. 45
That is, without minimizing the influence of the prison on inmates, Pérez
Guadalupe underscores the influence of inmates themselves on daily life in
detention, a phenomenon that recurs in the majority of overcrowded detention
centers in the region. 46 These two complementary visions can be synthesized in
two theories of prison cultures: the autonomous theory, which asserts the
existence of a particular prison culture created by conditions in a given detention
center, and the cultural importation theory, which asserts that the degree of
adaptation of inmates in prisons depends on the external conditions prior to
incarceration. 47 Pérez Guadalupe has described a continuum of local criminality
subculture that is transferred to the prison. This, in turn, foments the
development of prison cultures and the subsequent influence, though the return
of prisoners to society, of these cultures on the practices of criminality in each
country. 48
Following Clemmer, various American authors have addressed a range of
issues related to these dynamics. Scholars have considered the relationship
between informal and formal organizations of detainees and the goals of prison
administration, as well as the role of informal leaders and their contribution to
the goal of rehabilitation. 49 These authors have demonstrated that authorizing
visits, use of telephones and other items permits inmates to make daily life more
tolerable while allowing them to maintain their lifestyles and social relations,
including their criminal identity. 50 Other studies, such as that by Camp and
Camp, emphasized the need to control the importation into the detention context
of criminal subcultures. 51 Irwin and Cressey posited that disorder and inefficient
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Sykes & Messinger, supra note 40, at 12–19; John Irwin & Donald R. Cressey,
Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture, 10 SOC. PROBS. 142, 142–45 (1962); H. Cline, The
Determinants of Normative Patterns in Correctional Institutions, in 2 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
CRIMINOLOGY 173–84 (Nils Christie ed., 1968); Charles W. Thomas, Theoretical Perspectives on
Prisonization. A Comparison of the Importation and Deprivation Models, 68 J. CRIM. L. AND
CRIMINOLOGY 135, 136–37 (1977).
48. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, 403–06.
49. Bernard B. Berk, Organizational Goals and Inmate Organization, 71 AM. J. SOC. 522,
534 (1966); JAMES B. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY. CHICAGO:
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 167-171 (1977).
50. See generally Jacobs, supra note 49, at 97, 99
51. GEORGE M. CAMP AND CAMILLE GRAHAM CAMP, PRISON GANGS: THEIR EXTENT,
NATURE, AND IMPACT ON PRISONS 26–27 (1985).
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administration of detention centers were the principal causes of violence
between and among inmates. 52
John Dilulio, one of the most influential scholars in the field of prison
administration, was a harsh critic of administration practices that included
organizations of inmates. 53 Dilullio is very concerned by the risk posed by
participation of inmates in prison administration through figures such as inmate
advisory councils, bodies authorized to negotiate with the administration on
behalf of detainees. 54 The participation of inmates’ organizations, Dilulio wrote,
through the election of gang leaders to positions of authority, could transform
these bodies into a form of self-rule by inmates. 55
Dilulio warned that the management of the prison would be placed at risk
should authorities be unable to impose their will without the participation of
inmates. 56 Thus, he supported a careful selection and oversight of inmate leaders
to avoid negative results. 57 Dilulio contrasted two extreme forms of prison
administration: i) the control model, characterized by a robust role for prison
administrators, which establishes and applies regulations and sanctions over
virtually all aspects of the life of detainees, and ii) the responsibility model,
which permits the administration to maintain order through controls and
restrictions on the prison population, at the same that it permits some degree of
self-rule. 58
In the control model, communication and directives from the administration
to prison staff are restricted to clearly established, professional and formal
channels, and lines of command in accordance with rank and authority level. 59
Quasi-military uniforms and insignia are employed; compliance with policies
and procedures to ensure control involve strict routines, close monitoring, and
oversight of the activities of inmates. 60 Any non-conforming behavior by
detainees results in report, disciplinary procedures and sanctions imposed in
visible and exemplary fashion. 61 All decisions are taken exclusively by prison
administrators. 62
By contrast, if the chain of command, protocols, directives, and
communication between administrators and prison staff are rigid, hierarchical,
and strict in the control model, then in the responsibility model communication
52. Irwin & Cressey, supra note 47, at 334.
53. JOHN DILULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENT 38 (1990).
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 38–39.
56. Id. at 22.
57. Id. at 36.
58. Id. at 104.
59. Id. at 142.
60. Id. at 100–05, 175.
61. Id. at 102–03.
62. Id. at 175.
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between administrators and staff is informal, open, and direct. Relations
between detainees and prison staff are informal and casual. Inmates may initiate
contact with staff, request explanations, and express opinions about perceived
unfairness or injustices, etc. 63 Thus, inmates enjoy greater freedom to comply
with the policies and procedures of the detention center. 64 Infractions and
disruptive behavior are subject to sanctions at the discretion of the prison staff. 65
Means of deciding on sanctions include counsels or other groups, as well as
negotiation with detainees, who may be involved in making decisions. 66
The consensus model is a third alternative that lies between these two
extremes. This model is characterized by the application of rules and policies
through a combination of control, order, and formal and informal
communication between the administration and prison staff. 67 The consensus
model also includes an emphasis on compliance with formal procedures that
involve detainees themselves. 68
Darke’s studies in six Brazilian prisons demonstrate how, at least in the Latin
American centers he considered, life in prison is directed and controlled by
inmates and not by penitentiary staff. 69 In these prisons, it is those deprived of
liberty in inhumane conditions who organize to provide cleaning, other services,
distribution of goods, and to ensure discipline and security. 70 The process of
filling this management vacuum results in the administration of prisons by gangs
like the First Command of the Capital––Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC––
and the Red Command ––Comando Vermelho, CV. 71 It is worth noting here that
the origin of the First Command of the Capital, Brazil’s most powerful and
dangerous criminal organization, can be traced to the initially legitimate protests
against physical abuses by guards raised by a group of detainees in a particularly
brutal prison in São Paulo. 72 The fact that a group initially focused on rights
abuses suffered in detention could morph into a massive, dangerous, criminal
enterprise speaks volumes on the importance of treating those detained, and all
others, with a minimum degree of humanity. 73

63. Id. at 118.
64. Id. at 119.
65. Id. at 120.
66. Id. at 128–29.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 131.
69. See Sacha Darke, Inmate Governance in Brazilian Prisons, 52 HOWARD J. CRIME & JUST.
272, 275 (2013).
70. Id. at 276–77.
71. Id. at 275–80.
72. Id. at 279.
73. According to InSight Crime:
The PCC formed in the wake of the October 1992 massacre in São Paulo’s Carandiru
prison, in which Brazilian security forces killed over 100 prisoners following a riot. In
August 1993, a group of eight prisoners who had been transferred to Taubaté prison
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Darke, in a later work, speaks of discipline and order as a negotiated coproduction of prison administrators, the general prison population and gangs.
Weegels, in a similar vein, describes the “arrangements” (arreglos) between the
detainees and authorities in Nicaragua as a form of power sharing or cogovernment in which inmates exert pressure through violent acts and riots. 74
Jennifer Peirce has also found these “arrangements” to exist in the old prisons
of the Dominican Republic. 75 These arrangements are characterized by the
informal authority of the bosses who negotiate with prison authorities,
generating mechanisms of pressure on the general prison population. 76
Andrés Antillano has studied the self-rule of detainees in Venezuelan
detention centers based on informal structures that confront prison
administration, maintaining order, and regulation of prison life through the use
of violence, displacing control from authorities. 77 One of the first ethnographies
of the informal organization of detainees in Latin America was that of Pérez
Guadalupe in the Lurigancho Penitentiary. 78 Author Pérez Guadalupe studied
Lurigancho for five years (1987–1992), documenting the lack of policies within
the prison that allowed the 5,000 inmates to impose their own laws and norms.
His subsequent works compare Lurigancho to informal organization in
penitentiaries in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. 79
The study of the informal organizations of detainees has enjoyed a resurgence
in recent years in part due to the strength of these groups and the consequences
of uncontrolled self-rule by detainees in some centers in Latin America. 80 As
Skarbek explains, this resurgence is a result of the rise of prison gangs, groups
able to provide “centralized governance,” including dispute resolution
mechanisms, a means of protecting private property, and security of illicit
markets within the prison. 81 Thus, the self-rule of inmates arises in the context
formed the PCC to fight for justice for the massacre and to push for better prison
conditions.
First Capital Command - PCC, INSIGHT CRIME, https://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organizedcrime-news/first-capital-command-pcc-profile (last updated Mar. 9, 2020).
74. Julienne Weegels, Prison Riots in Nicaragua: Negotiating Co-Governance Amid Creative
Violence and Public Secrecy, 30 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 61, 62 (2020).
75. Jennifer Peirce, Contrasting Econ. and Contested Governance in Two Types of
Dominican Prisons, Remarks at Law & Society Association Panel “Power and Prisons in Latin
America I” 4 (May 30, 2019) (draft paper on file with author).
76. Id.
77. See Antillano, supra note 4, at 26–28.
78. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, 1–9.
79. Pérez Guadalupe, ‘De Flaites a Cocodrilos,’ supra note 4, 22–29; Pérez Guadalupe,
Nuevas Drogas, supra note 4; PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at
44.
80. Sacha Darke and Cris Garces, Surviving in the new mass carceral zone, 229 PRISON
SERVICE J. 2–3 (2017).
81. David Skarbek, Prison Gangs, Norms, and Organizations, 82 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
96, 97–98 (2012); David Skarbek & Danilo Freire, Prison Gangs, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
CORRECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 399, 400 (O. Hayden Griffin & Vanessa H. Woodward eds.,
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of detention, in which it is necessary to punish aggressive behavior, oversee
internal conflicts, and control opportunism in the exchange of goods when these
activities and behaviors are not controlled by the institution itself. At the same
time, self-rule serves to promote cooperation between and among inmates from
diverse social, cultural and criminal cultures. 82
In the Americas, the study of self-rule has been driven in part by some of the
more fantastic consequences of the power of these organizations. The most
extreme example has been uprisings in Brazilian detention centers over the past
two decades. 83 Various studies and human rights reports (referenced in this
article) have observed the frequency and violent nature of these riots. 84 At a
superficial level, riots are attributed to the strength of prison gangs, as well as
the dangerous and violent nature of the prison subculture, which is linked to the
criminal subcultures outside prison. 85 It is often true, in practice, that
organizations inside prisons bear close ties to organizations outside detention
centers.
Perhaps the clearest example of the dangerous relationship between
organizations within and without prison walls has been that of the “First
Command of the Capital” (Primeiro Comando da Capital) in São Paulo, Brazil.
In May 2006, in response to a proposed prisoner transfer to which they objected,
the leaders of the PCC launched riots in dozens of detention centers throughout
the state, as well as attacks outside prisons on police precincts across São
Paulo. 86 The violence shut down South America’s largest city for days. 87 As
two analysts have written in analyzing the intense, coordinated attacks, the PCC
maintained a:
hierarchical structure of disciplined and obedient “employees”
capable of executing orders without questioning them. . . . [T]hey had
an able and agile communication system among leaders, followers and
those who took orders, through protected channels barely permeated
2018); David Skarbek, Covenants Without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance
Globally, 110 AM. POL. SCI. R. 852 (2016).
82. Skarbek, supra note 81, at 98–99.
83. Violence within detention centers in Venezuela is likely as severe as in Brazilian jails and
penitentiaries. While the subject of some study, there has been more literature seeking to analyze
the nature of organizations within Brazilian centers, at least in English. See Marcelo Rocha and
Silva Zorovich, The Decline of Brazilian Penitentiary System, in PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 183–93 (Rosen Jonathan and Brienen Marten eds., 2015).
84. ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
OFICINA EN COLOMBIA, CENTROS DE RECLUSIÓN EN COLOMBIA: UN ESTADO DE COSAS
INCONSTITUCIONAL Y DE FLAGRANTE VIOLACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 13 (2001); Carranza
Elias, Situación Penitenciaria en América Latina y el Caribe ¿Qué hacer? ANUARIO DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS 8, 31–66 (2012); Andrés Antilllano, When Prisoners Make the Prison. Self-rule in
Venezuelan Prisons, 229 PRISON J. SERV. 26, 26-30 (2017).
85. Sacha Darke, Who is Really in Control of Brazils Prisons, in THE CONVERSATION (2017).
86. Sérgio Adorno & Fernando Salla, Organized Criminality in Prisons and the Attacks of the
PCC, 21 ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS, 7, 7–8 (2007).
87. Id.
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by external interference by means of cell phones, telephone exchanges
and “carrier pigeons”. . . . [T]he organization was prepared to control
the simultaneous execution of countless rebellions; to attack distinct
targets without a predetermined logic and with a high level of surprise;
to appear at any location and disappear immediately; to issue orders
and soon after, suspend actions and negotiate with high state
authorities. What was most surprising is that the base territory of the
entire organization is within the prisons of São Paulo State, in
particular maximum security facilities where the main leaders of PCC
are found. 88
In effect, according to Skarbek and Freire, the organizations of detainees
function much like a government, providing social order and satisfying the
internal demands not fulfilled by the authorities. 89 In particular, these
organizations offer security (by protecting the physical integrity of people, their
property, and their spaces) and, at the same time, they promote the tranquility
necessary for the exchange––or trafficking––of authorized or prohibited goods
and services, through the threat of violence, to maintain order. 90 Thus, the
capacity of these organizations to control daily life in prison, a capacity that is
superior to that of authorities, renders them a threat to deficient prison systems
in the Americas. 91
Skarbek and Freire analyze the development and growth of prions gangs not
so much as a matter of the logic and culture of criminal gangs being transferred
from the streets into the prison, but rather as a rational response to the lacunae
existing in closed centers. 92 In other words, by tracing the history of the
development of organizations within prisons, Skarbek and Freire demonstrate
the economic rationality of these organizations. 93 Further, they show precisely
how the organization of these groups responds to the needs of detainees while
in detention. Thus, Skarbek and Freire’s analysis questions the core idea implicit
in much prison literature—that criminal subcultures as they exist on the street
are transferred into the prison space. 94 Rather, what Skarbek and Freire show is
that individuals in detention come together as groups to respond to the
organizational needs left unfulfilled by prison structure. 95 The importance of
this, as we will see in the success of the Peruvian Prison Reform process, is that
prisoners, 96 whether gang members on the streets, or unaffiliated offenders, are
likely to act rationally and in response to the structures and incentives inside
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Skarbek & Freire, supra note 81, at 399, 404.
Id. at 400, 404
Id. at 399–400, 404.
Id. at 400.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 399–400, 404.
See infra Sec. III.
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detention centers once they find themselves in those confined spaces. As such,
by changing the incentives and disincentives for different kinds of organizations
within prisons, authorities can change the very nature of prisoner organizations
within prisons. Thus, life within prison is not destined to be ruled by whatever
principals or groups exist and “rule” on the street. No doubt, the subcultures
that detainees bring with them from their lives before detention are relevant. But
this is true of the relationship between the cultures within institutions and the
cultures of those who come together to form those institutions. Military culture
is a function of the cultures of those in the military, just as college campus
culture is related to the subcultures of those who come together in the university.
No serious study of either of those institutions, however, would contend that life
in the military or in colleges can be explained primarily by the cultures of high
school students. The same youths from high school become troops and
university students, but in those settings develop very different institutional
cultures.
Instead, prison organization can be restructured as long as that organization
takes into account prisoners’ experiences, their interests, and their rationality.
Common sense dictates that provided their basic needs are addressed, and as
long as detainees see concrete advantage to engaging peacefully with authorities,
they are likely to do so. 97 Prison life is not street life. The idea that detainees
are doomed to form violent, dangerous, powerful organizations in direct and
permanent conflict with authorities simply because that is what criminals do is
not based in social science. The belief may be popular, but cannot withstand
scrutiny, as we demonstrate with reference to the Peruvian experience.
Intelligent structures and management of detention centers that engage with the
organizations of detainees in ways that are respectful, but that also ensure respect
for authorities and staff and common, decent standards of co-existence, can be
achieved. Indeed, this was achieved in Peru. 98
III. CO-RESPONSIBLE PRISON GOVERNANCE IN THE PERUVIAN PRISON
REFORM PROCESS, 2011–2019: FOUR MODELS
The urgency for reform of the penitentiary system in Peru arose as a political
priority after the end of the Fujimori administration in 2000. 99 At that time, the
Ministry of Justice developed prison infrastructure plans to be implemented in
public-private partnerships. 100 The year 2002 saw the approval of the National
Penitentiary Treatment Plan (Plan Nacional de Tratamiento Penitenciario)

97. Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 57–62.
98. See infra Sec. III.
99. See Ignacio Berdugo, Carmen Gómez & Martín Nieto, El Sistema Penal y Penitenciario
Peruano: Reflexiones Político Criminales, en 28 América Latina Hoy 19–47 (2001).
100. Nathan, supra note 30, at 295.
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(“Plan”). 101 The Plan viewed overcrowding as the most serious issue, and thus
established as its first measure a penitentiary infrastructure construction plan. 102
Five years later, new “Penitentiary Policies” (Políticas Penitenciarias) were
approved, which included concrete actions to respond to overcrowding through
the use of public treasury resources, as well as strategic alliances with the private
sector in an ambitious program to build detention centers. However, these plans
never came to fruition. 103
The prison reform process begun in 2011, on which this article is based (the
Peruvian Prison Reform Process), was designed with an integral approach. The
Reform Process sought to include different aspects of prison administration,
expressing these in a Ministerial Resolution entitled “10 Penitentiary System
Reform Measures” (10 Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Penitenciario,
Resolución Ministerial Nº 0141-2012-JUS). 104 Two central points of departure
were prison staff corruption and detention center overcrowding. 105 In addition,
the Resolution included measures designed to enhance infrastructure quality; to
improve prison security, health care, service programs, and institutional
administration; to improve the quality of personnel; to stimulate participation of
the private sector; to prevent and reduce crime; and to establish a reeducation
program. 106 In late 2016, authorities issued three additional legislative decrees
on penitentiary benefits, and on restructuring and strengthening of the prison
system (DL Nº 1296, Nº1325 y Nº1328). 107 As we contend here, despite the
change of national administration that year, the Prison Reform Process
continued. The most visible result of these efforts (2013–2019) nationally was
a significant reduction in internal violence. As we show, after years of repeated,
massive riots, there were none for several consecutive years and then a lone
rioting incident at the end of 2018. The incident took place in a cellblock in the
“special closed regime,” or highest security prison in Challapalca, a center that

101. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, PLAN NACIONAL DE TRATAMIENTO PENITENCIARIO (2003).
https://www4.congreso.gob.pe/comisiones/2004/ceriajus/planNacPenitenciario.pdf (reporting on
steps approved by R.M. No 343-2002-JUS).
102. Id.
103. Alejandro Solis, Política Penal y Política Penitenciaria (2008) (Pontificia Universidad
Católica del Perú).
104. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Mears & Watson, supra note 29, at 195.
107. Lucia Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento de la Población Penitenciaria en el Perú,
Medidas Alternativas y Vigilancia Electrónica, 37 ESTUDIOS PENALES Y CRIMINOLÓGICOS 357
(2017) [hereinafter Cisneros, Factores de Aumento].
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held fewer than 200 inmates. 108 We highlight the most important aspects of the
Reform in the pages that follow.
A. The Battle Against Corruption
The first urgent, cross-cutting measure was the fight against corruption. 109
The Reform Process began with a “risk map” of corruption that identified five
critical moments: a) intake at the “little jail” (carceleta) and classification; b)
entrance into the prison and placement in a cellblock and cell; c) remaining or
relocation (in a given prison, cellblock or cell) while in detention, receipt of
food, entry of items or visits, access to public phone, and processing of requests
by inmates and their families; d) procedures for detainees’ records and emission
of forms by prison staff; e) procedures involving detainees’ permanent files,
completion of conviction and release of the detainee. 110 On this last point, it
should be noted that the Peruvian Penal Code, like the law in much of Latin
America, contemplates progression of persons deprived of liberty from “closed
regime,” or full-time incarceration, through day release, to parole, based on
technical examinations applied by prison staff. 111 Given the discretion involved
in these decisions, progressing, or not progressing at any stage, involves the risk
of corruption.
The Reform Process identified the main corruption risks according to area
(administration, treatment and security) and according to the level of corruption:
a) macro-corruption, involving the highest level authorities, such as the illicit
award of contracts for construction or prison maintenance or the hiring of
unqualified consultants; b) medium level corruption, involving the directors and
administrators of prisons, such as authorizing suppliers who failed to comply
with legal requirements or the purchase at inflated prices of goods or furniture;
and c) micro-corruption, involving prison staff seeking bribes from inmates or
visitors, such as charging to transfer from one cellblock to another, or for
favorable technical (day leave or parole) reports, or to allow irregular visits by
relatives. 112 This classification allowed for greater oversight and control of staff,
and a significant increase in sanctions (the overwhelming majority for acts of
corruption), as can be seen in Table 2, below.

108. Acaba sin Víctimas el Motín en el Penal de Challapalca en el Sur del Perú, EL
(Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.eleconomista.es/legislacion/noticias/4398182/11/12/
Acaba-sin-victimas-el-motin-en-el-penal-de-Challapalca-en-el-sur-de-Peru.html.
109. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 3 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
110. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, Tres Años de Gestión, 66 (2014) (presentation).
111. See Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento, supra note 107.
112. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, Tres años de Gestión, Presentation (2014), 68.
ECONOMISTA
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Table 2: Decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal, INPE 2006–2018 113

YEAR

TERMINATION

2006 to 2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

7
36
31
25
26
1
1
3
0

PLACED ON
SUSPENSION ADMONITION TOTAL
LEAVE
10
15
6
38
140
85
33
294
75
11
8
125
113
55
8
201
73
52
3
154
2
12
1
16
20
30
10
61
22
19
9
53
31
79
24
125

Until 2014, disciplinary procedures were carried out under a disciplinary
regime that was modified in 2015. 114 In 2015, disciplinary sanctions fell
drastically. As shown in the table, in subsequent years, the number of sanctions
issued increased again, although the number of terminations fell considerably.
In addition, Presidential Decree Nº232-2012-INPE/P created the Special
Anticorruption Group (Grupo Especial Anticorrupción, GEA). 115 A toll-free,
anti-corruption telephone hotline was established to receive anonymous
complaints regarding acts of corruption committed by prison staff. 116 This type
of intervention, in turn, contributed to the increase in the number of reports
recommending disciplinary processes against INPE staff, as is seen in Graph 2.

113. Statistics, INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO-PERU (2019), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/
estad%C3%ADstica1.html. Data for the chart compiled by the authors from the Instituto Nacional
Penitenciario-Peru.
114. Resolución de Presidencia Ejecutiva No. 02-2015-SERVIR-PE, Normas Legales 549237
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/aprueban-la-directiva-regimendisciplinario-y-procedimiento-resolucion-n-101-2015-servir-pe-1215676-1/.
115. Resolución Presidencial Instituto Nacional Penitenciario N°232-2012-INPE/P (May 17,
2012) (Peru).
116. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 71.
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Graph 2. Reports Recommending Opening of Disciplinary Processes, INPE 2011–2018

Based on data provided by INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019) *
See Note, Table 2.
B. Investment in Infrastructure
As may be seen in Graph 3, between 2011 and 2016, capacity increased by
6,600 nationally. An additional 3,500 spaces in detention centers were under
construction. 117 This increase in capacity was a central element of the Prison
Reform Plan’s goal of increasing space in existing detention centers and adding
new prisons. 118 Despite the fact that this increase was far greater than any
growth in capacity in the two previous decades, it was insufficient to respond to
the rapid growth in the prison population (30,000 additional inmates between
2011 and 2016). 119 During this period, the following new prisons were built or
entirely remodeled: Virgen de Fátima, Satipo, Yurimaguas, Tarapoto, Juanjuí,
Chincha, Puno, Trujillo (women), and Cerro de Pasco. Capacity was added in
the following detention centers: Cajamarca, Puerto Maldonado, Jauja, Ancón I,
Trujillo (men), and Chimbote. 120 Within this infrastructure plan, emphasis
should be placed on the construction of the new Cerro de Pasco jail (at an altitude
of more than 4,000 meters, or some 13,000 feet above sea level), including 600
117. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 4 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
118. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 2 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
119. Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento, supra note 107, at 358.
120. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1, 5 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
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places in “special closed regime” (the most restrictive, high security regime in
the Peruvian prison system). 121
Graph 3. Overcrowding and Housing Capacity in Peruvian Detention Centers, 2006-2018. 122

Despite the significant growth in prison population in recent years, there has
not been a parallel increase in the amounts budgeted for the National Prison
Service, INPE, as can be seen in Graph 4. 123 The amount of capital investments
averaged 130 million Peruvian Soles, or around US$30 million, employed in the
construction of new prisons and the overhaul of others. What did increase were
current expenses (which doubled from 302 million soles in 2011 to 654 million
soles in 2018). 124 That is, INPE was faced with a significant increase in inmates
each year without a corresponding increase in capacity for those additional
inmates. 125

121. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 96.
122. Statistics, supra note 113.
123. TRANSPARENCIA ECONÓMICA PERU, CONSULTA AMIGABLE (MENSUALS): CONSULTÁ
DE EJECUCIÓN DEL GASTO, https://apps5.mineco.gob.pe/transparencia/mensual/.
124. Id.
125. Lucía Nunovero Cisneros, Cárceles en América Latina 2000-2018: Tendencias y desafíos
(Pontifical Catholic U. of Peru, Working paper No. 50, 2019).
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Graph 4. Current Expenses, Capital Expenses and Prison Population, 2006–2018. 126

C. Prison Staff
In 2011, the Peruvian Legislature approved the Law on the Special Public
Penitentiary Career, (Ley de la Carrera Especial Pública Penitenciaria, Ley N°
29709). 127 The application of this law led to better working conditions and wage
increases for prison security and non-security staff, as well as to the
incorporation of new hires. 128 In addition, the law allowed for the creation of
differentiation of levels of employment, thus rendering work in the penitentiary
system a career. 129 The law also developed disciplinary procedures and
strengthened the system for punishing irregularities and infractions committed
by prison staff. INPE hired “public administrators” (gerentes públicos), 130 in

126. Statistics, supra note 113. For the purposes of this graph “POP” means “Prison
Population” and “SOLES” are Peruvian currency.
127. Ley de la Carrera Especial Pública Penitenciaria, Ley N° 29709, EL PERUANO 444765
(2011), https://leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/Leyes/29709.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 444768.
130. The term “public administrators” refers to high level staff, duly trained and selected by
the National Civil Service Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Servicio Civil, SERVIR), subject to
norms established by Law No. 30057 (Ley N°30057, Ley de Servicio Civil), with administrative or
management responsibilities and a higher salary (funds from which were drawn from a special
fund) than prison staff.
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key administrative positions, valuing penitentiary staff through recognition of
their work. 131
In November 2012, the last strike of prison staff took place, lasting 19 days
and involving negotiation with staff of the Ministry of the Economy. 132
Improvement in relations with prison staff contributed to the stability of
management, given that one of the principal causes of the removal of the
directors of INPE were the frequent occurrence of strikes or acts of violence
within detention centers. 133 From the early 1990s until 2011, the average period
of service for the president of INPE was just eight months. With the Penitentiary
Reform Process, from 2011 until 2019, there have been only four presidents of
the institution. Further, no one has left the presidency as the result of problems
with prison management. 134
D. Improvements in the Management of Information
Until 2011, statistical reports of INPE were limited to registering prison
population, level of overcrowding, and the sex and legal status of detainees. 135
Beginning in 2011, INPE implemented integrated prison registry policies,
leading to concrete improvements in statistical methodologies, permitting the
production of monthly reports with a broad range of indicators such as period of
detention, particular crimes committed, place of origin, reason for incarceration
and release, rate of recidivism, etc. 136 These data, in turn, allowed for a more
thorough criminological analysis of detainees and enabled informed decision
making. 137 It became possible to develop a map of criminogenic exposure

131. Resolución de Presidencia Ejecutiva No. 163-2012-SERVIR-PE, Normas Legales
549237 (Nov. 28, 2012), https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/asignan-profesionales-delcuerpo-de-gerentes-publicos-en-div-resolucion-n-163-2012-servir-pe-872790-3/.
132. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, COMUNICADO NO. 29 – 2012 INPE,
ANTE HUELGA INDEFINIDA INPE INFORMA SOBRE GESTIONES REALIZADAS E INSTA A LA
REANUDACIÓN DE LABORES (2012).
133. El Sistema Penitenciario: Componente Clave de la Seguridad y la Política Criminal.
Problemas, Retos y Perspectivas, Informe Defensorial Nº 154-2011/DP DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO
51–52 (2011); See Berdugo, supra note 99, at 45.
134. The President of INPE who initiated the reform (after three and a half years in office) left
the position when he was designated Minister of the Interior. The second INPE president (after a
year and a half) left the position due to a change in the national government. The third (after and
year and a half in the position) left due to allegations of improprieties prior to his service with INPE.
135. Statistical Reports 2010- Statistics, INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO-PERU (2019),
https://www.inpe.gob.pe/estad%C3%ADstica1.html.
136. Statistical Reports 2012- Statistics, INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO-PERU (2019),
https://www.inpe.gob.pe/estad%C3%ADstica1.html.
137. See INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 3
(2012); see also Lucía Nunovero Cisneros, Quel Avenir pour les Mesures Alternatives á
L’incarération dans la Démarche Politco-criminelle Péruvienne?, 35 ARCHIVES DE POLITIQUE
CRIMINELLE 249 (2013).
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(“exposición criminógena”). 138 This map showed the specific areas with the
greatest concentration of prison population in the country, serving as the basis
for social prevention measures. 139
E. Maintenance of Physical Plant
INPE promoted greater participation of inmates in the management of the
physical plant of detention centers as a central element of the Prison Reform
Process. This policy began with improvements in the core spaces (cells,
bathrooms, corridor lighting, patios used for visits, etc.), in the preparation of
food, and in the cleaning and maintenance of discipline in cellblocks. This was
the first step in building confidence between inmates and staff, a means of
making them co-responsible partners for order and peaceful coexistence, without
ceding functional authority of the institution.
The improvement in the physical plants began in Lurigancho, the largest and
historically most problematic detention center, with committees and resources
pooled by the inmates themselves. 140 It extended to the majority of detention
centers throughout the country, with the exception of the highest security centers
operating in “special closed regime,” which limits inmate organization and their
representation. 141 Prior to this process, destruction of cellblocks and other
structures in detention centers was common, particularly during disturbances
and riots. 142 Through this process, detainees not only ceased destruction of
prison spaces, but also began to feel ownership in their own environment,
developing a sense of belonging. 143
138. See P. Wikström, Crime Propensity, Criminogenic Exposure and Crimen Involvement in
Early to Mid-adolescence, MONATSSCHRIFT FUR KRIMINOLOGIE AND STRAFRECHTSREFORM, 92,
253–266 (2009) (discussing the concept of criminogenic exposure); Prevención del Delito con
Políticas Públicas Enfocadas en las Personas, CAF (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.caf.com/
es/actualidad/noticias/2014/09/prevencion-del-delito-con-politicas-enfocadas-en-las-personas/
(applying policies to Latin America).
139. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 53
(2016), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/normatividad/documentos/4295-informe-estadistico-diciembre2019/file.html (presenting data on Criminogenic exposure analysis for peruvian case in Lima
neighborhoods).
140. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3.
141. Camille Boutron, El Uso Estratégico del Espacio Carcelario como Elemento Referencial
de la Construcción de Identidades en Conflicto en el Perú, BULLETIN D’INSTITUTE FRANCAIS
T’ETUDES ANDINES, 43, 47 (2014).
142. See Muere un Tercer Preso Tras Incendio y Motín en Cárcel de Perú, Última Hora (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.ultimahora.com/muere-un-tercer-preso-incendio-y-motin-carcel-perun938208.html.
143. An important factor that facilitated this new vision of the prions as “their” daily space was
the interest of those deprived of liberty in receiving visits from family members in decent and
hygienic spaces, despite the overcrowding, which at times reaches three times capacity. In light of
this, faced with the limited institutional budget to maintain detention centers, INPE authorized
inmates to repair and improve their cellblocks. This served not only to enhance the physical plant
in which they lived but also fostered organization among inmates to maintain and care for living
space in the detention center. See also Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61.
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F. Image of INPE
An important commitment undertaken by the authorities and detainees
through their representatives was the maintenance of order and peaceful
coexistence within detention centers. 144 This order and calm served not only to
improve the quality of life within prisons but also to enhance the image of prison
authorities and detainees in public opinion. 145 That is, INPE worked to release
information about the successes of the Prison Reform Process, 146 with the
understanding that this, in turn, would improve the chances of detainees seeking
early release and other benefits from judicial authorities. 147
INPE promoted a transparent model of prison management, allowing
journalists to enter detention centers and almost all parts of any given center. 148
This openness to media oversight served to convey the achievements of the
Reform Process to the general public. 149 The highest profile activities were
those conducted at Lurigancho, the most emblematic prison in the country and
also the largest, with some 10,000 detainees. 150 What was most remarkable
about the activities in Lurigancho is that they were taking place in a center which
144. As the Ombusdman reports show: Derechos Humanos y Sistema Penitenciario,
Supervisión de Derechos Humanos de Personas Privadas de Libertad 1998–1999, Informe N° 29
DEFENSORÍA DELF PUEBLO 7 (2000), https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/informe_29.pdf; Supervisión del Sistema Penitenciario 2006, Informe N°113
DEFENSORÍA DELF PUEBLO 84 (2006). https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/ApoyComisiones/
comision2011.nsf/021documentos/5115F08BFE6D1A3605258154005B2DCA/$FILE/Informe_N
_113.pdf.
145. See Nota de Prensa No. 368-2019-INPE, Internos del Penal de Lurigancho Participaron
en Desfile Junto con Empresarios (2019), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/prensa/noticias/item/3083internos-del-penal-de-lurigancho-participaron-en-desfile-junto-con-empresarios.html; see also
Nota de Prensa No. 271 -2018-INPE, Internos del Penal de Cañete Participan en Desfile Cívico
Patriótico (2018), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/noticias-region-lima/item/1949-internos-del-ep-ca%
C3%B1ete-participan-de-desfile-c%C3%ADvico-patri%C3%B3tico.html
146. Nota de Prensa No. 04-2012-INPE, INPE Inicia Acciones de Rehabilitación con Internos
de Alto Riesgo (2012), https://www.peru.gob.pe/docs/PLANES/182/PLAN_182_Nota_de_
Prensa_N%C2%BA04-2012-INPE_2012.pdf
147. Informe Penitenciario, Una Mirada al Mundo Carcelario Peruano, COMISIÓN
EPISCOPAL DE ACCIÓN SOCIAL 71 (2006), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/23775.pdf.
148. See Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, Notas de Prensa/Noticias, https://www.inpe.gob.pe/
prensa/noticias.html.
149. Id.
150. See generally FwichyGM, RELL PENAL DE LURIGANCHO + 1000 RECORD
GUINNESS HD Cortito, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2013), https://wwww.youtube.com/
watch?v=8JvskSE2zhY (showing the Guinness record of 1,000 inmates engaged in a Full-Body
Fitness Program); Victor Candia, Internos de los penales de Lurigancho y Mujeres de Chorrillos
participan en VIII Festival del Cajón, YOUTUBE (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=B9LWd6aaJbU (showing a performance by 1,000 inmates playing the Peruvian cajón, a
percussion instrument, made by inmates in the detention center); Latina Noticias, Reos del penal
Lurigancho escenifican el ‘Padre Nuestro’ para el papa Francisco, YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C241Z1rVP8 (showing a video of some 2,000 inmates
playing for Pope Francis in 2018).
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only a few years earlier was generally considered to be an uncontrollable, violent
haven for hardened criminals. It is worth highlighting that during the eight years
of “Management by Dialogue” 151 with inmates and of an open-door policy with
media sources, not a single incident of violation of security was recorded. By
2020, detention centers in Peru had ceased to be a topic of sensationalist
reporting, even by media sources known primarily for sensationalism.
G. Reduction of Violence
In Latin America, there are no clear, universally accepted measures of
violence in detention centers. Still, the number of escapes, violent deaths,
disturbances and riots are good indicators of violence within prisons. In this
regard, as we have noted, the Penitentiary Reform Process brought riots nearly
completely to an end. From 2011 until early 2020, there was a lone riot, in a
small detention center (Challapalca, with 180 inmates) in late 2018. 152
In Peru, a riot (motín) may be defined as an instance of generalized
indiscipline in a detention center. This can be distinguished from a disturbance
(reyerta), which is an instance of indiscipline or clashes involving inmates––
both between the authorities and inmates or between and among inmates––
limited to a single wing or cellblock. 153 Disturbances, then, are events of lesser
magnitude that are limited in scope and that do not spread to other areas of a
detention center nor undermine the general internal security of the prison. 154 In
a riot, detainees generally seize control of the entire detention center to challenge
authorities. 155 This may occur when an uprising beginning in a particular
cellblock gains the support of other inmates or when all cellblocks organize to
revolt together. 156 Further, riots generally prompt the intervention of other
authorities and institutions, such as the Peruvian National Police (PNP), the Red

151. See Informe Sobre la Situación del Establecimiento Penitenciario de Réginmen Cerrado
Ordinario Lurigancho, Defensoria del Pueblo 8–11 (1997), https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/informe_5.pdf (discussing violanec during the 90s); Política Nacional
Penitenciaria y Plan Nacional de la Política Penitenciaria 2016–2020, GOB.PE 51
https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/3853016153F24A15052581290074
6BB1/$FILE/D.S.005-2016-JUS.pdf (regarding reduction of violence after 2011 as part of the
assessment for the recent Decreto Supremo 005-2016-JUS).
152. It should be noted that in the riot in Challapalca in 2018, the inmates never seized control
of the entire detention center; they were able to take over one wing of a cellblock and to take
hostages. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) and the
Catholic Church intervened to resolve the crisis. See Acaba sin Víctimas, supra note 108.
153. COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LAS PERSONAS PRIVADAS DE LIBERTAD EN LAS AMÉICAS, OEA 36–39
(2011).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. This is described in a 2011 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
The “motín” at Centro el Pavoncito in Guatemala in 2007 and “motín” en El Penal Frontón en Perú
in 1986. See Berdugo, supra note 99, at 34, 77.
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Cross, the Ombudsperson, the Catholic Church, etc. 157 They also generally
involve the taking of hostages, deaths, serious injuries, the use of weapons and
the setting of fires. 158 That is, in a riot, the prison authorities lose control of the
detention center. 159
In sum, in operational terms, we can say that a riot is a rupture of the established
order in a detention center by inmates, frequently followed by the seizure of
spaces, destruction of buildings and the taking of hostages. There may be
disorder, disputes and fights within particular areas or cellblocks (which we
define as disturbances (reyertas), but these do not rise to the level of a riot, given
their localized nature, the fact that they do not prompt the solidarity of other
detainees, and the fact that they do not place at risk the internal security of the
entire prison.
Table 3. Riots and Disturbances in Detention Centers in Peru, 2005–2018. 160

YEAR

DISTURBANCES

RIOTS

Total

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

6
6
8
5
7
8
9
3
5
3
3
8
5
6

3
6
2
8
3
1
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
1

9
12
10
13
10
9
12
6
5
3
3
8
5
7

157. See El Papel Mediador de la Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia en Los Casos de
Alteración del Orden Interno en Loas Centros de Reclusión, DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO DE
COLOMBIA- INSTITUTIO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 5, 81–82, (2005),
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/24209.pdf
158. Medidas Privativas y no Privativas de la Libertad, El sistema penitenciario. Manual de
instrucciones para la evaluación de la Justicia Penal, UNODC 25 (2010); El Papel Mediador,
supra note 157, 81–82 (describing relevant cases).
159. The operational definition “prison riot occurs when prison authorities lose control of a
significant number of prisoners in a significant area of the prison for a significant amount of time”
is provided by Bert Useem and Anne M. Piehl, Prison Buildup and Disorder, 8 PUNISHMENT &
SOCIETY 95 (2006).
160. Compiled by authors. Based on Data from INPE (2019).
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To determine the number of riots and disturbances, we employed the
definitions in the text of this article.
The new institutional culture and rapid resolution of conflicts brought the
reduction of riots to historically low levels in Peruvian prisons. As can be seen
in Table 3, in some years, there were no riots in the country, despite historically
unprecedented, high levels of overcrowding.
Table 4. Deaths in Penitentiaries in Peru, 2012–2018. 161

BY
VIOLENT
YEAR
DISEASE DEATHS

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

163
179
220
151
212
245
214

18
22
10
6
9
14
8

OTHER
CAUSES

TOTAL
DEATHS

12
3
12
39
17
10
34

193
204
242
196
238
269
256

As
percentage
N° of
VIOLENT
DEATHS
/TOTAL
DEATHS

9.3%
10.8%
4.1%
3.1%
3.8%
5.2%
3.1%

DEATHS PER
PRISON
POPULATION
1/Total pop.

3411
3073
7196
12874
9114
6099
11367

Another of the facts frequently considered by the international literature as an
indicator of prison insecurity is the occurrence of violent deaths inside
prisons. 162 As shown in Table 4, between 2012 and 2018, deaths from violent
acts were reduced from 18 to 8. 163 This latter figure is fairly low, particularly in
light of the consistent growth in the prison population over that six-year
period. 164 Moreover, for many years prior to the Prison Reform Process, it was
common for guards to find firearms (pistols, machine guns, war grenades, etc.)
during searches. In this period, “security” of the pavilions meant having their
own weapons to protect themselves from the attacks of other pavilions. 165 It
should be noted that between 2013 and 2019 there were no incidents of shots
fired inside Peruvian prisons. 166 Lurigancho, for example, as Postema,
Cavallaro and Nagra observed, “has been transformed from an institution
161. Based on data of INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019). Figures prior to 2012 are
not reliable due to the narrow scope of data collected. See, supra Section IV.D.
162. Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced Assessment of Supermax
Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 242 (2006).
163. See Table 4.
164. Nunovero Cisneros, Factores de Aumento, supra note 107, at 13.
165. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, n.10.
166. See Table 4.
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characterized by rampant violence in a setting of unhygienic anarchy, to a
controlled system in which authorities and inmates communicate and foster nonviolent coexistence within the prison.” 167

167. Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61.
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Table 5: Escapes from the Peruvian Penitentiary System, 2005–2018

RATIO—

YEAR

FROM A
PRISON

FROM
OUTSIDE
PRISON

2005
2006
2007*

19
38
33

18
10
14

37
48
47

2008

33

8

41

43,466

1,317

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

58
9
19
38
0
3
1
9
5
7

8
5
8
3
9
3
3
4
4
0

66
14
27
41
9
6
4
13
9
7

44,254
46,198
52,700
61,390
67,597
71,961
77,242

763
5,133
2,774
1,616
0 Fugas
23,987
77,242
9,114
17,162
12,991

TOTAL

PRISON
N° OF ESCAPES
POPULATION /PRISON
POPULATION
33,594
1,768
985
37,445
41,546
1,259

82,023
85,811
90,934

*Based on data from INPE (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario, 2019)
On August 15, 2007, there was an earthquake in Lima that destroyed most of
the Chincha prison (686 inmates), including the perimeter wall, facilitating the
escape of inmates from the prison. Many remained in the detention center;
others were recaptured shortly thereafter in the immediate vicinity of the
prison. 168
Finally, between 2013 and 2018, there was a significant decrease in escapes,
both from inside detention centers and from outside the walls of a prison (for
instance, from a penitentiary hospital, from a judicial proceeding, or during
transport to a hospital or court). In 2013, not a single escape from a prison was
registered, the first time a year transpired without an escape in the history or the
records of Peruvian prisons. 169 As shown in Table 5, this decrease generated an
increasingly favorable ratio of escapes per prison population, since the prison
population continued to increase rapidly, and the escapes remained at low
levels. 170 In 2015, for example, a single inmate escaped from a prison. In 2018,
no escapes were recorded from outside the prison (again, during judicial
proceedings, transfer, from a hospital, etc.). 171

168. Regresan a la Cárcel 242 Presos Peruanos que se Fugaron Tras el Terremoto, EL PAÍS,
Aug. 24, 2007, https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/08/25/actualidad/1187992801_850215.html
169. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 62.
170. Id.
171. See Table 5.
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H. The Four Models of Penitentiary Management in Peru
The consolidation of a new approach to prison management in Peru, which
led to the reduction of intra-prison violence, contrasts sharply with the self-rule
of inmates, which was, unfortunately, the previous norm in Peruvian detention
centers. The Prison Reform Process of 2011 was based on an appreciation of
the history and nature of inmate self-rule, a system of control shaped by the
consolidated organization of inmates and a prison culture that arose from the
criminal culture of the “faites” (traditional leaders in Peruvian criminality). 172
Based on an understanding of this history, and with a humanistic vision that
respected the citizenship of inmates, the Reform Process emphasized dialogue
with detainees, recognizing them as actors and protagonists in prison
management. 173 The team that led the INPE in those years understood not only
central aspects of prison management but also prison culture. As a result, they
fostered a tripartite model of dialogue that formed the basis of the new
management: from a) the INPE presidency (or its regional representatives)
towards b) the directors of each penitentiary establishment, and c) the
representatives of the inmates. 174 In the past, communication with the
organization of inmates was limited to agreements with the directors of
individual detention centers (often in extra-legal agreements). 175 With the
Reform Process, communication would involve the participation of the INPE
management team, who visited the system’s detention centers regularly to talk
with the representatives of the inmates. 176 After interventions and dialogue by
the INPE leadership, the detention center directors would be responsible for
monitoring and overseeing the peaceful coexistence agreements reached and
establishing mechanisms for accountability, surveillance, and transmission of
information. 177

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 174–85.
Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 62
See El Sistema Penitenciario, supra note 133, at 223.
PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 187–88.
Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 124.
As pointed by Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61–62.
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Graph 5: Types of Relationships Between and Among Prison Actors

In effect, a different vision of prison management was adopted when engaging
the various actors involved, all of whom agreed to cooperate with the Reform
Process, according to their function. For many years, prison officials had
worked in an autonomous manner, viewing inmates as their opponents, with
predictably poor results. 178 In 2011, INPE undertook a new approach, in a
context of limited resources (rendering expansion of security, treatment
programs and infrastructure improvement impossible). 179 The Prison Reform
Process acted to strengthen the links between INPE management and prison
staff, generating greater commitment from all and fostering a sense of belonging
to the institution. INPE provided visibility to the representatives of the existing
internal organizations, which had existed for many years. This visibility and
recognition given to the inmates’ representatives launched a process by which
these leaders seized the protagonist role from the clandestine leadership centered
on the Taitas (leaders of the largest criminal groups in the prison who, until then,
had exercised unchallenged control over the inmates in their cellblocks). The
new leaders would be the delegates (delegados), elected by all inmates. In this
way, the delegate became the person with representative force before other
inmates and prison authorities. It is worth emphasizing here that the importance
and power of delegates varied significantly from prison to prison: in Lurigancho,
delegates became managers of coexistence, while in Ancón II, the delegate was
a mere spokesman. 180

178. A handbook addressing this problem was published in 2008. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIAINSTITUTO NACIONAL PENIENTENCIARIO, MANUAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS APLICADOS A LA
FUNCIÓN PENITENCIARIA 10 (2008).
179. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 10 MEDIDAS DE REFORMA DEL
SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO 1 (2012), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
810635CDF2139A7F052581300073F277/$FILE,10_medidas.pdf.
180. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 185-93; López Noam
y Espinozan Gelin, Democracia Entre Rejas: Representación y Elecciones en el Penal de
Lurigancho, en PERÚELECCIONES 18 (19), 135-37 (2019).
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The Reform Process prioritized the Institutional Government model,
eliminating entirely so-called “liberated areas” (tierras liberadas). 181 Our
baseline point of departure (both for employees and inmates), posits that the
management of detention centers should be within the exclusive power of the
penitentiary authorities. What remained to be determined was how best to
exercise that authority in light of the population and criminological reality of
each detention center. We contend that one of the fundamental elements for
reestablishing legitimate authority was the exercise of “Management by
Dialogue” in those detention centers in which this approach was viable, without
placing the security of any given center at risk. 182 Below, we present the four
management models as ideal types.
Likewise, we explain that the INPE presidency established a style of
differentiated management based on the security level of each detention center,
the danger presented by the inmates, the criminological prognosis, and the
center’s institutional capacity, which resulted in four ideal management models.
One model was eliminated entirely from the prison system and serves as a
negative reference. 183 This is a “model” of a poorly managed detention
center. 184 The other three models continue in the Peruvian prison system. As
shown in Graph 6, beyond the “ordinary” and “special” prison regimes provided
for in the Code of Sentence Enforcement (Código de Ejecución Penal), the
reality of each detention center required the application of a particular model of
prison management. In maximum security centers such as Challapalca, a
centralized prison authority was imposed, while in other centers, INPE
leadership applied a protective model (in minimum security centers) and a coresponsibility model (in the densely populated centers where exercising
complete control would have been virtually impossible). Thus, we can identify
four models of prison management in Peru, based on two criteria: “Institutional
Government” and “Management by Dialogue,” as we explain below.
“Institutional Government” (IG) is the exercise of authority over all aspects
of life in detention, as is ordinarily required by the relevant legal norms. The
extreme opposite of “Institutional Government” is the total lack of official
authority, or “self-government” by the inmates, which almost inevitably
devolves into self-rule by inmates. In this sense, in terms of maximums and
minimums, the maximum form of Institutional Government occurs when
penitentiary authorities have all spaces and areas of prison life under their
control (whether by means of authority or dialogue); the minimum degree of
181. El Sistema Penitenciario, supra note 133, at 34–35 (describing “Tierras libeadas”).
182. See PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 45 (describing
prison operations from 1987–1992 in San Juan de Lurigancho Prison in Lima while there were no
guards in that prison).
183. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 4, at 3 (recognizing
described in this work operated form 1987–1992 in San Juan de Lurigancho Prison in Lima while
there were no guards in that prison).
184. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3.
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Institutional Government occurs when penitentiary authorities practically
abandon the prison or control nothing inside its walls, allowing inmates to
assume the control function.
“Management by Dialogue” is the regular practice by prison authorities of
conversing and communicating with inmates (or their representatives) about the
most important aspects of prison management, seeking their regular opinion and
participation. The maximum of “Management by Dialogue” occurs in detention
centers in which dialogue is fluid and activities that involve inmates are
coordinated with them (whether for institutional or illegal purposes). The
minimum level of Management by Dialogue exists in prisons in which there is
no dialogue or coordination with inmates, either because the inmates, in fact,
control the prison and have no interest in dialogue, or because the prison
authority has total control and feels no need to coordinate anything with the
inmates.
It should be noted that to establish the new management models, it was first
necessary to achieve comprehensive control of all areas of the country’s prisons
and to reestablish legitimate authority.
Graph 6: Degrees of Institutional Government

1. Total Control of the Institution
The Challapalca Penitentiary is the best example of this type of center.
Challapalca is located at some 13,000 feet or 4,000 meters above sea level and
is operated as a “special closed regime” center. 185 Challapalca holds a relatively
185. Informe Especial Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en la Cárcel de
Challapalca, Depertamento de Tanca, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS Doc. 3, no. 4 (2003).
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small population (150–180 detainees) and has no overcrowding. 186 However,
those deprived of liberty in this center had all been sentenced to long prison
terms and were considered to be dangerous and uncooperative by Peruvian
prison authorities. 187 This regime focused on security, rather than treatment
programs (which, though lower in priority, continued). The representation or
organization of the inmates was prohibited, as was transit between cellblocks. 188
Visits and time for recreation (“patio”) were also highly regulated. 189 The staff
was adequate, with emphasis on prison security. Prison guards at Challapalca
received a special bonus for working there. 190 In addition, the center had
recently remodeled infrastructure that was maintained in good condition. 191
This model of total institutional control was also applied in a large part of Ancón
I (Piedras Gordas), and in a substantial part of the Cochamarca Penitentiary, as
well as in areas housing detainees in the “special closed regime” in other prisons
in the country. 192
2. Guardianship Model
This model is found at the minimum security Ancón II Penitentiary whose
population (about 1,500 inmates) was made up mainly of young offenders
detained for non-violent crimes. 193 Ancón II was a new center without
overcrowding and with excellent infrastructure and adequate resources for
prison treatment programs and security. 194 The center maintained a strict
division between cellblocks and segregated areas for particular groups, such as
foreign nationals (generally held for drug trafficking), elderly inmates,

186. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 12
(2016).
187. Informe Especial, supra note 185, at 27.
188. Art.63 Reglamento: Aprobado Mediante Decreto Supremo N15-2003-JUS, CONDIGO DE
EJECUCIÓN PENAL (September 11, 2003), https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_
uibd.nsf/D04A8DAD08FE381A05257BF8008222BA/$FILE/18.pdf.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Inversión en las mejoras de los centros penitenciarios demandaron una inversión
superior a los S/. 53 millones, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos (April 9, 2015),
https://www.minjus.gob.pe/ultimas-noticias/noticias-destacadas/ministro-gustavo-adrianzenentrega-obras-de-mejoramiento-en-penales-de-puno-y-tacnainversion-en-las-mejoras-de-loscentros-penitenciarios-demandaron-una-inversion-superior-a-los-s-53-millones-el/.
192. Art.62 Reglamento: Aprobado Mediante Decreto Supremo N15-2003-JUS, CONDIGO DE
EJECUCIÓN PENAL (September 11, 2003), https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_
uibd.nsf/D04A8DAD08FE381A05257BF8008222BA/$FILE/18.pdf.
193. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 11, 34
(2016).
194. UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE- BID-OPEN SOCIETY, PROGRAMA DE TRATAMIENTO C.R.E.O.
Y F.O.CO.S.-PERU, http://cesc.uchile.cl/buenaspracticasenprevencion/bbp_docs/29_programa_
de_tratamiento_CREO_y_FOCOS.pdf.
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evangelical groups, and women charged with terrorist offenses. 195 In this model,
with relatively sophisticated separation based on criminological classification
and limited movement within the center by inmates, it was possible to implement
differentiated treatment programs. As a result, most of the activities and
schedules were determined by prison authorities. 196 This management model,
which focused on robust treatment programs (education and work), was applied
in most of the minimum-security pavilions in the prison system, which had
populations amenable to rehabilitation and sufficient personnel and
infrastructure to accommodate rehabilitative programming.
3. Co-responsibility Model
This model is found most clearly at the Lurigancho Penitentiary (ordinary,
closed regime), which held over 10,000 detainees—more than three times
capacity—with outdated infrastructure and insufficient staff. 197 Although
Lurigancho was a detention center considered to be operating in the “ordinary
regime” classification, a significant part of the population had long criminal
histories and had been sentenced to many years in prison. 198 In this type of
detention center, inmate organizations remained active. 199 As a result, it was not
possible for the institution to regulate all aspects of daily life (as in Challapalca
or Ancón II). 200 Thus, it was necessary to work with the inmates and wellstructured intra-prison organizations to achieve a model of management that
“incorporated” in a regulated fashion the inmates’ delegates in the management
of the prison. This was particularly the case with the norms of cohabitation and
coexistence in the cellblocks. This is, therefore, a model focused on the coresponsibility and dialogue between and among the actors involved. The model
was applied in other centers, especially those with high levels of overcrowding,
limited staff, and representative organizations of those deprived of liberty.
Detention centers with these conditions constituted the majority of the Peruvian
Prison System. 201 In these circumstances, the Prison Reform Process focused
on eliminating entirely the trafficking of drugs and prohibited items, low-level
195. Retos del Sistema Penitenciario Peruano: Un diagnóstico de la realidad carcelaria de
las mujeres y varones. Resumen ejecutivo, Informe de Adjuntía Nº 006-2018-DP/ADHPD 39
(2018).
196. See Art.44 Reglamento: Aprobado Mediante Decreto Supremo N15-2003-JUS, CONDIGO
DE EJECUCIÓN PENAL (September 11, 2003), https://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/
con4_uibd.nsf/D04A8DAD08FE381A05257BF8008222BA/$FILE/18.pdf.
197. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 13
(2016).
198. Id. at 38.
199. López Noam & Espinoza Gelin, Democracia Entre Rejas: Representación y Elecciones
en el Penal de Lurigancho en Perú, ELECCIONES 18 (19), 135–37 (2019) (recognizing the
organizations discussed in PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3).
200. Defensoria del Pueblo, supra note 157, at 5–7
201. INSTITUTO NACIONAL PENITENCIARIO- INPE, INFORME ESTADÍSTICO DICIEMBRE 12–13
(2016) (detailing the list of overcrowded peruvian prisons).
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and mid-level corruption, physical abuse between inmates, etc. 202
Implementation of the co-responsibility model led to significant reductions in
the levels of violence within detention centers, incidents of collective violence,
escape attempts, violent deaths and riots, use of firearms, and the taking of
hostages. 203 In 2017, INPE assumed responsibility for Lurigancho, after 30
years under the control of the National Police. 204 This model was applied in
most detention centers in Peru. 205
4. Self-Rule by Inmates
Self-rule by inmates was perhaps the defining characteristic of the Lurigancho
Penitentiary in the 1990s. 206 This model no longer exists in the Peruvian prison
system in practice. We include it here as a model type because it is one that
existed for years in Peru but which should never return. This model involved
the complete control by inmates faced with a prison institution that was
practically non-existent. 207 The National Police, given the responsibility for
Lurigancho, limited their role to the external control of the prison, ceding to the
inmates full authority over the cellblocks. 208 “Liberated zones” existed within
the center in which authorities would not enter and where the inmates themselves
oversaw all aspects of daily life, including control of food, alcohol, drugs,
prohibited items, and the weapons and munitions in each cellblock. 209
Detainees in Lurigancho were overwhelmingly repeat offenders who brought
to the prison their long criminal histories and cultures developed on the street. 210
Most faced long sentences, including life terms. 211 At this time, the three centers
in “special closed regime” had not yet been built. Inmates were assigned to
Lurigancho based on their place or neighborhood of origin because there was no
penitentiary institution to classify those deprived of liberty according to accepted
criminological methodology. 212 Exceptions to the place of origin basis for
grouping of inmates were made for areas occupied by those detained for drug
trafficking and terrorism, ex-police and military officers, religious groups, and
202. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 66–71.
203. Política Nacional Penitenciaria, supra note 151 (regarding reduction of violence after
2011 as part of the assessment for the recent Decreto Supremo 005-2016-JUS).
204. Nota de Prensa No. 173-2017-INPE, INPE Recobra Administración del Penal de
Lurigancho
y
Entrega
Llaves
a
Servidores,
(2017).
https://www.inpe.gob.pe/prensa/noticias/item/460-inpe-recobra-administraci%C3%B3n-delpenal-de-lurigancho-y-entrega-llaves-a-servidores.html
205. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 3.
206. Id. at 35–37.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 57–62.
210. Id. at 83–86.
211. Id. at 138–39.
212. Id. at 46–54.
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other particular groups. 213 This method of spatial organization facilitated the
continuation of urban criminal subcultures, which were transferred from the
streets to the prison, reproducing their customs, values and norms of
coexistence. 214 The self-rule of the prison was delimited by three criteria:
territorial (according to the cellblock one belonged); group (according to the
neighborhood of origin); and prestige (based on a hierarchy of crimes and
criminality). 215 This delimitation allowed for a degree of order and co-existence
(i.e., ordered anarchy). Internal conflicts were also managed based on these
three criteria, with group and individual fragmentation, and tensions between
consensus and conflict. 216 Pérez Guadalupe has referred to these tensions as
fusion and fission. 217 This model of self-rule by inmates existed in the majority
of detention centers in Peru in the 1990s as in previous decades, albeit in
differing degrees. 218
As may be inferred, incorporating “Institutional Governance” with more
“Management by Dialogue” in a significant number of detention centers
required direct communication with the representatives of inmates, as well as
their participation, in a controlled fashion, in certain aspects of prison
Internal organizations and their representatives (the
administration. 219
delegates), once afforded tangible and formal representative roles, assumed
responsibility for much of what happened in their cellblocks, both vis-à-vis the
inmates who had elected them as well as in relation to the prison authorities to
whom they were required to account for their actions. 220 This responsibility did
not exempt delegates from the rules of the detention center. Some still
committed violations. 221 Indeed, a good number were transferred to other
prisons for disciplinary infractions. 222
A central element in this long process of prison pacification and governance
has been respect for the basic human rights of those deprived of liberty. We
consider this to be a sine qua non condition, necessary to establish and rebuild
mutual confidence between staff and detainees. As such, it constituted the basis
on which further relationships could be built. It was thus necessary to convince
prison staff that respect for human rights had to be the point of departure for

213. Id. at 36.
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 36.
216. Id. at 89–90.
217. Id. at 90
218. JOSÉ MARÍA RICO, CRIMEN Y JUSTICIA EN AMÉRICA LATINA 355 (1977); see Berdugo,
supra note 99, at 46.
219. See Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 62.
220. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 57–62.
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id. at 5.
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coexistence-grounded dialogue. 223 To do so, prison guards and staff had to
accept that dialogue and mutual respect could be promoted without sacrificing
the authority of staff and administrators. Respect for human rights and dialogue
allowed for the construction of an institutional climate in which the support of
detainees for peaceful coexistence became possible, a climate in which inmates
became agents co-responsible for the good governance of prisons. As a result,
a new institutional culture blossomed, one with a different type of relationship
between staff and inmates. 224 This relationship has continued to the present with
the new prison authorities. It is important to note that the new form of
management did not involve hostility directed against inmate organizations but
rather opposed “self-rule” by inmates. The process served to challenge and
eliminate inmate self-rule while incorporating the organization of inmates. 225
Nor did this process imply an abandonment of the institutional duties of INPE;
instead, prison staff and management continued to act as authorities within
detention centers. 226
It is worth nothing that the “co-responsibility model” was not applied across
the board, but rather only in those prisons in which staff and administrators were
not able to effectively control all aspects of the daily life of detainees. 227 In
some prisons, this model was applied partially, or other models were applied.
That is, the Prison Reform Process distinguished four models in Peru (three of
which have been employed, the fourth of which has been prohibited). The
Process assessed the context in each detention center and applied the most
effective model, as is shown in Graph 6. In addition, the fact that prison
administration was in the hands of civilians (and not military or police)
generated an understanding of management of detention centers quite different
from the typical police or military approach, one that had been the norm within
INPE until mid-2011. 228 Prior INPE leaders (police and military officers) had
recognized the existence of organizations of inmates but had viewed them as
exclusively dangerous and threatening. 229 The Prison Reform Process also
involved a return to a civilian prison administration body (INPE) and a shift
away from police/military orientation. Since 2011, INPE has been led
exclusively by civilians. 230

223. El Sistema Penitenciario, supra note 133, at 223 (recognizing the recommendations of
the Ombusdman in 2011).
224. See Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 62.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Defensoria del Pueblo, supra note 157, at 5–7.
228. Prior to 2011, the usual practice was to select the leadership of INPE from among highranking, retired military or police officers. From 2011 to 2019, the four Presidents of INPE have
been civilians with experience in prisons.
229. PÉREZ GUADALUPE, FAITES Y ATORRANTES, supra note 4, at 37.
230. See Política Nacional Penitenciaria, supra note 151.
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We should emphasize that institutional control—the fundamental pillar of the
Prison Reform Process—has continued to the present throughout the Peruvian
prison system. All detention spaces in the country are controlled (in varying
degrees) by prison authorities. There are no longer spaces ruled by inmates
(“liberated spaces” or tierra liberada) as before, or as exist currently in prisons
in Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. 231 On the contrary,
directors of detention centers are able to (and must) enter into any space within
the prison they direct to assess conditions and respond as needed or to supervise
activities. 232 So, too, are other authorities––such as prosecutors and police––
able to enter as needed. 233 Regular searches became a routine occurrence in
detention centers throughout the country without significant resistance from
detainees, who generally accept the necessity and legitimacy of this form of
control by authorities. 234 Opposition to searches is thus generally limited to
those that involve abusive behavior by the Police Special Operations Group
(Grupo de Operaciones Especiales, GOES). 235
One fundamental aspect of the Prison Reform Process is that the directors of
INPE established and maintained positive relations not only within the system
(with staff and inmates) but also with other societal actors. 236 These included
Chambers of Commerce, sporting associations, businesses, politicians, and
others. In this way, although detention centers were not a priority for the
Ministry of Justice (to whom the INPE responds hierarchically), institutional
confidence was successfully developed by the Prison Reform Process. Evidence
of this confidence can be found in the decision to place all prisons in Peru under
the control of INPE (rather than the police)—a clear vote of confidence in the
institution. 237 That is, INPE went from being a problem for the justice sector (or
a “thorn in its side” as one Minister would say about prison administration) to

231. Sacha Darke, Inmate Governance in Brazilian Prisons, supra note 69, at 275; Antillano
Andrés, Cuando los Presos Mandan: Control Informal Dentro de la Cárcel Venezolana, 24 SPACIO
ABIERTO CUADERNO VENEZOLANO DE SOCIOLOGÍA 24-25 (2015).
232. Retos del Sistema Penitenciario Peruano: Un diagnóstico de la realidad carcelaria de
las mujeres y varones, Informe de Adjuntía Nº 006-2018-DP/ADHPD DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO,
8–9 (2018).
233. Id.
234. See Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 60.
235. Mujer es designada jefa de seguridad de grupo de élite del INPE, ANDINA September 19,
2015,
https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-mujer-es-designada-jefa-grupo-elite-seguridad-el-inpe575963.aspx (explaining well established specialized unit, interventions accompanied with
prosecutors ensure legal standards); Nota de Prensa No. 05 -2012–INPE, Enero (2012),
https://www.peru.gob.pe/docs/PLANES/182/PLAN_182_Nota_de_Prensa_N%C2%BA05-2012INPE_2012.pdf.
236. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 127.
237. Nota de Prensa No. 152-2018-INPE, INPE Receives the Administration of Last Prison
that Remained in Charge of Peruvian National Police (2018), https://www.inpe.gob.pe/prensa/
noticias/item/1618-inpe-asume-direcci%C3%B3n-del-%C3%BAltimo-penal-a-cargo-de-lapnp.html.
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being recognized for successful management of potential conflicts, despite
inadequate budgets and overcrowding. 238
While the Peruvian prison system is still in the process of maintaining the
gains achieved, it is fair to recognize not only the continuity of the changes but
also their sustainability. One key element of the desired sustainability is the
reduction of violence within detention centers, which allowed for improvements
in social reinsertion policies and partnerships with civil society actors and
institutions. 239 One important project that has been consolidated in recent years
is the “Productive Jails” (Cárceles Productivas), which promotes, jointly with
industry, the installation of workshops in detention centers. 240 This program has
been important for detainees. Now, rather than drawing resources from their
families, those deprived of liberty have been able to contribute through income
received from these workshops. This has been possible due to the reduction in
riots and disturbances. Before the Prison Reform Process, detainees would often
destroy workshops and machinery in protest against the institution. 241 Now,
those deprived of liberty see these workshops and machinery as their own and
as a source of income that can help support their families, generating positive
externalities. 242
Finally, almost a decade after the beginning of the Prison Reform Process in
Peru, we should note some deficiencies that have yet to be overcome. These
deficiencies and abuses are more frequent in the most overcrowded centers with
the fewest prison staff: Corruption: Despite the new policy of sanctions and
disciplinary measures to oversee staff, INPE has not been able to end low-level
and mid-level corruption in detention centers. There continue to be a high
number of legitimate complaints by family members that cite inappropriate
demands for payment of “fees” by prison staff. Nor has it been possible to end
the trafficking of drugs, alcohol, and prohibited objects within cellblocks. While
true that family members have been caught on occasion trying to sneak
contraband, such as mobile phones and drugs, into detention centers, in most
cases of entry of prohibited goods, prison staff themselves are the primary
suspects. Informal real estate market: Due to the high level of overcrowding in
some prisons, cell space is sold or rented. While the detention center determines
the cellblock to which a given inmate is admitted, it is often unable to guarantee
that inmate a place within a given cell. In the case of threats to the physical
238. Consejo Nacional Penitenciario INPE, supra note 112, at 128–132.
239. See id. at 127.
240. The initiative was the basis for the Decreto Legislativo para la Promoción e
Implementación de Cárceless Productivas, Decreto Legislativo 1343 (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-legislativo-para-la-promocion-eimplementacion-de-ca-decreto-legislativo-n-1343-1471548-3/.
241. MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA, PLAN NACIONAL DE TRATAMIENTO PENITENCIARIO 20 (2003).
https://www4.congreso.gob.pe/comisiones/2004/ceriajus/planNacPenitenciario.pdf (reporting on
steps approved by R.M. No 343-2002-JUS).
242. Carranza Elias, supra note 84, at 32.
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integrity of particularly vulnerable inmates, generally each detention center will
have designated areas outside the ordinary cellblocks. Often, inmates must pay
illegal charges to access these areas.
Aggressions: While the frequency of sexual abuse and killings has fallen
considerably and means of reporting abuse have been improved, severe
overcrowding has increased levels of tension within detention centers, creating
dangerous conditions. One means of controlling intra-cellblock and intra-cell
violence has been to establish “discipline delegates,” responsible for ensuring
order and ending disputes between and among detainees.
As may be seen, overcrowding, which has intensified in recent years, is the
underlying cause of a series of related problems that generate a loss of
institutional authority. As a result, in some cellblocks, the risk that coresponsibility will degenerate into “apparent management” or to self-rule by
inmates exists, as we shall see below.
IV. PRISON GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA: BETWEEN ABUSE BY PRISON
AUTHORITIES AND SELF-RULE BY INMATES
We propose “Prison Governance” as a potentially transformative concept to
reorient prison management in Latin America, based on the Peruvian Prison
Reform Process of 2011, as well as our understanding of detention centers in the
region. We understand Prison Governance to be the ability to manage
problematic detention centers in an integral manner through the commitment of
all actors—prison staff, administrators, and inmates—involved. As François
Vallaeys writes, “Governance begins when government is no longer possible;
that is, when actors must together regulate their actions . . . . Governance
produces agreements based on co-responsibility.” 243 In this regard, the need for
this type of prison management becomes apparent when authorities recognize
that, in practice, they are unable to maintain control of those detained, either due
to excessive population or to some other institutional shortcoming. Faced with
this challenge, we argue, governance models should incorporate into prison
management the organic association of inmates but not their self-rule. 244 Herein
lies the secret and the inflection point of this model, given that the line between
self-organization and self-rule is quite delicate.
Because we assert that the only legitimate authority should be the legally
constituted authority—provided it is rights-respecting and acts in accordance
with the rule of law and human rights—we avoid the terms “co-government” or
“co-management” to define the role of persons deprived of liberty in the Prison
Governance Model. That said, we support the co-responsible inclusion of the
organization of inmates as valid actors in the development of daily life in the
243. François Vallaeys, Virtud, Justicia, Sostenibilidad: Una Ética en 3 Dimensiones para la
Responsabilidad Social de las Organizaciones, in MEMORIA 1ER. CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DE
RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL: ÉTICA PARA EL CAMBIO 704, 709 (2013).
244. See Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 59.
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detention center. In this regard, inmates participate and dialogue with prison
authorities in an exercise of “detention center citizenship.” After conversing
with the representatives of the inmates and discussing different possible options
to improve management of the detention center, prison authorities decide which
measures are most viable. Together, prison authorities, staff, delegates, and
inmates, apply the agreed upon measures. Central in this process of dialogue is
the determination, by consensus, as to which actions will improve and which
will undermine the quality of life of those deprived of liberty in the detention
center. Our goal here is to suggest a new model of prison management based on
consensus, rather than conflict, between and among the principal actors in the
detention center—prison staff and detainees. Once their shared interests are
recognized (peaceful co-existence, better services, transfers, elimination of
abuses, etc.), joint actions to achieve these goals may be defined. Observers
from civil society, the Red Cross, and religious groups may participate in this
process as guarantors of the good faith of all involved, provided they are seen as
credible actors by prison staff and detainees. In this regard, “prison governance”
was developed based primarily on the experience at the Lurigancho Penitentiary,
in which the Peruvian Prison Reform Process was applied through regular
dialogue with the president of INPE and his closest advisors, on the one hand,
and the delegates, who collectively represented some 10,000 inmates, on the
other. 245
As the Peruvian case study demonstrates, institutional objectives can be
achieved by incorporating the views of inmates regarding the management of
the detention center. 246 The governance model constitutes an alternative to the
typical models—authoritarian administration at one extreme and the absence of
official authority on the other—that have been dominant in Latin America. 247
The Prison Governance model indentifies the administrative, logistical, and
security capacity of each detention center. As such, this model is consistent with
what Bryans refers to as the creation of a secure and protected detention center
by means of a positive, ethical contribution from staff and detainees to the joint
objectives of the community. 248
On the other hand, it is important to distinguish “Prison Governance” from
what Darke has described in Brazilian prisons (and Peirce in Dominican ones)

245. See López Noam & Espinoza Gelin, Democracia Entre Rejas: Representación y
Elecciones en el Penal de Lurigancho en Perú, ELECCIONES 18, 135–37 (2019).
246. See supra Sec. III.
247. See Astrid Arrarás and Emily Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 9 (discussing self governance
of inmates model which characterize Latin American prisons); De Dardel, Julie & Söderström, Ola,
supra note 5, at 15 (discussing the authoritarian model imported to Latin America); Stephen
Nathan, El Sistema Penitenciario: Modelo de Gestion Privada o Pública, en POLITICA CRIMINAL
Y REFORMA PENITENCIARIA, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS 309 (2012).
248. See SHANE BRYANS, PRISON GOVERNORS: MANAGING PRISONS IN A TIME OF CHANGE
128–46 (2007).
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as “prison co-government.” 249 “Co-government” in these prisons is the result of
negotiation of order and convenience between prison administrators and de facto
prison leaders, generally gang and organized crime figures. 250
The differences between and among detention centers, the level of
organization that inmates achieve, as well as the modes of interaction with prison
administrators may be seen in the four historic types of prison administration in
Latin America proposed in Graph 7 below. These are ideal types of prison
management or administration, applying the same axis as in the Peruvian case
(greater or lesser degrees of “Institutional Government” and “Management by
Dialogue”) to classify detention centers in the Americas. These four ideal
models may be used to assess detention centers that are extremely difficult to
control, the focus of this article. Obviously, one cannot generalize any one of
these models to particular countries in light of the fact that, within a given
country, one finds varied realities across detention centers. That said, we believe
that one can apply “Prison Governance” in those detention centers that suffer
from extreme overcrowding (generally macro-prisons) and have become
ungovernable by ordinary prison administration. Further, given the need for
short-term solutions to the many challenges posed by overcrowded,
ungovernable prisons, the “Prison Governance” model offers the possibility of
reducing levels of violence through the gradual, rational incorporation of inmate
organizations into management as an intermediate goal on the path to recovery
of legitimate, rights-based, rehabilitation-focused management.
It is worth noting that these four proposed types correspond to “extraordinary”
detention centers (even though they may constitute the majority in some
countries), in which ordinary prison administration that complies with legal
norms is not possible. In light of the failures of prison authorities in Latin
America to manage detention centers in accordance with legal standards and
human rights, 251 we observe, in practice, four identifiable forms of prison
administration:

249. SACHA DARKE, CONVIVIALITY AND SURVIVAL: CO-PRODUCING BRAZILIAN PRISON
ORDER (2018); Weegels, supra note 74; Peirce, supra note 75, at 6.
250. SACHA DARKE, CONVIVIALITY AND SURVIVAL: CO-PRODUCING BRAZILIAN PRISON
ORDER (2018); Julienne Weegels, Prison Riots in Nicaragua: Negotiating Co-Governance Amid
Creative Violence and Public Secrecy, INT’L CRIM JUSTICE REV. 62 (2020); Peirce, supra note 75,
at 6.
251. Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 6-9.
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Graph 7: Models of Prison Management in Latin America

A. Authoritarian Administration (Absolute Control)
We find this model in centers where the institutional authorities exercise their
authority, but with dehumanizing excesses and/or violence. Prison staff control
all the space and time of detainees who lose the ability to decide over basic
aspects of their own daily life. The institution produces and enforces rigid rules
and guidelines. Generally, this model is applied in prisons with inmates held for
serious crimes. There are generally a large number of staff, most of whom are
focused on security. Those deprived of liberty are frequently dehumanized,
sometimes through illegal violence; the prison is understood as a space of
punishment and not rehabilitation.
The main rationale driving this type of administration is the search for security
when faced with a prison population considered dangerous. Whether due to
logic based on prevention, fear, or repression, staff exercise maximalist
measures of control to avoid any possible violation of internal rules. While there
is an effective “Institutional Government,” the risk of a violent reaction by
inmates is great. If staffing is not adequate in number or capacity, detention
centers in this model may be time bombs that can result in enormous death and
damage if detonated.
B. Abdication of Management (Self-Rule by Inmates)
This model is found in those prisons where the institutional authorities, in
practice, have renounced or abdicated their responsibility to manage all or part
of a given detention center. The institution limits its role to external security

412

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:367

(control of the perimeter of the prison or of cellblocks) and undertakes only
limited actions within the walls of the center. A clear indication of this type of
model are the so-called “liberated zones” or inmates’ zones in which staff are
not able to enter or may only enter with the permission of the inmates. That is,
staff have lost authority vis-à-vis inmates. Ordinarily, criminal gangs, drug
cartels, or other criminal organizations dispute leadership of the prison; for as
long as a group has seized leadership, it exercises control over the selfgovernment or self-rule. Generally speaking, it is not the case that authorities
do not wish to control the detention center; they are not able to do so. One
example of this interest in recovering authority, coupled with failure to exercise
control successfully, is the practice of extraordinary raids carried out by special
quasi-military police forces. While momentarily successful in establishing the
control of authorities, once these forces have left the prison, self-rule continues
as before.
There are many explanations of how centers reach this extreme situation: lack
of adequate staffing; the high level of danger of inmates; long sentences; fear of
reprisals from affiliates of inmates outside the detention center; etc. All these
factors add up to the inability of prison authorities and staff to control the
detention center. The security risks in this model are high, given that detainees
are allowed to continue criminal activity from within the detention center. At
any moment, these centers may experience escape attempts, violent deaths,
vendettas, riots or the taking of hostages.
C. Apparent Administration (Co-Government)
This model is found in detention centers in which the institution opts not to
exercise its functions, preferring to feign compliance with prison system norms.
Authorities do not completely lose control of detention centers but allow inmates
to govern cellblocks provided that they do not cause problems. It may be that
the institution has adequate budget and personnel to run the prison, but the staff
decide not to exercise authority out of fear or convenience or because they
receive payoffs to look the other way. That is, it is not that the staff are unable
to take control of the detention center; rather, they prefer not to do so. In this
case, one may speak of co-government, given that this model involves
coordination between staff and detainees, which is interrupted when there is an
uprising or riot. The arrangement between staff and inmates may also be
suspended temporarily when a high-ranking authority comes to the center.
The principal force behind this model is corruption, in the broadest sense, not
only in the form of payments that staff receive from inmates, but also because
these public servants fail to do the work that society has entrusted to them. The
risk of violence, escapes, and riots is severe in this model because, as in the case
of the “Abdication of Management (self-rule)” model, inmates are able to
continue to engage in criminal behavior from inside the prison, generating
illegality and violence outside the detention center.
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D. Prison Governance (Dialogue and Citizenship)
We find this model in those detention centers in which prison authorities
recognize that the conditions in the prison are such that traditional means of
administration will not be possible. The conditions that lead authorities to this
conclusion include poor infrastructure, overcrowding, deficient services, limited
personnel, and limited resources. Rather than applying one of the other three
models listed above, authorities seek to incorporate inmates’ organizations—but
not their self-rule—into prison management in concrete areas related to daily
life in the detention center as a means of achieving peaceful coexistence. This
model has proven to be viable not only in centers with first-time offenders but
also in prisons with repeat and violent offenders. The principal motivating factor
prompting the application of this model is the inability to control all aspects of
the institution.
Instead of relying on repression (“Authoritarian
Administration”) or abandoning detainees to their own fate (“Abdication of
Management” or “Self-rule by Inmates”), authorities may opt for “Management
by Dialogue,” engaging with the organic inmate organizations and recognizing
prison citizenship. If this type of model is well implemented, the risks of
violence may be reduced significantly but are not entirely eliminated. Even if it
is not possible to eradicate abusive conduct among detainees, traffic in
contraband, and micro-corruption by staff, if levels of violence are reduced and
living conditions for inmates are improved, “Institutional Government” becomes
more likely.
Crossing the two axes and variables, “Institutional Government” and
“Management by Dialogue,” we find different models of prison governance,
depending on the exact point of the maximums and minimums in each quadrant.
In this regard, it is important to appreciate where in this continuum we should
locate a given detention center, as well as where that center seeks to locate itself
in a given period of time and with given resources. This framework also allows
us to understand various arrangements that exist between authorities and
detainees, as well as between authorities and gangs and other organized criminal
groups in detention centers throughout Latin America, such as in Brazil,
Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic. 252
In addition, it should be noted that one may find more than one management
model within a single detention center, particularly larger centers in which
detainees of various security levels are separated into different cellblocks or
sections of a prison. Separation within detention centers may also occur based
on affiliation with gangs or other organized criminal groups, leading to the
development or adoption of different models according to the nature of the
particular population.
As we have indicated earlier, the classification we outline above is based on
an analysis of the administration of extreme and problematic detention centers
252. Darke & Garces, supra note 3, at 6–7; Weegels, supra note 250, at 76–77; Peirce, supra
note 75, at 6.
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in Latin America, in which, due to a range of factors, ordinary management
practices have failed. 253 Unfortunately, this type of extreme and problematic
center is not an exception in the Americas. As a result, the “Prison Governance”
model, which builds on the “co-responsibility” model in the Peruvian Prison
Reform Process, goes beyond the ordinary management in which institutional
objectives and prison rules provide the basis for administration. In this model,
there have been reductions in levels of violence and improvements in the quality
of life within detention centers, facilitating rehabilitation and control of these
problematic detention centers.
Graph 8: Prison Governance and Prison Management Models in Latin America

Finally, as may be seen in Graph 8, “Prison Governance” is an alternative to
the adoption of the “Authoritarian Administration” model, frequently the source
of grave abuses of fundamental rights through its ultra-punitive approach, as
described by De Dardel in Colombia, 254 or the “Abdication of Management or
Self-Rule of Inmates” model, which is nothing more than an abandonment of
the responsibilities and functions on the part of the detention center.
V CONCLUSION
In this article, we have outlined the most urgent problems facing prison
systems in Latin America, focusing on the challenges presented by the most
difficult detention centers—ones with violent offenders, gangs and criminal
organizations, and limited staff and resources. We have also detailed the
experience of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, which began in 2011 and
continues to develop. 255 This Reform Process led to the reduction of violence
in detention centers, as well as the eradication of inmate self-rule, riots, gun
battles, strikes by staff, and the taking of hostages. It also led to a significant
reduction in escape attempts and violent deaths. As a result of this experience,
we have proposed four models of prison management in Peru, focusing most
attention on the “Co-responsibility Model.” 256 Finally, using the same analytical
categories—more or less “Institutional Government” and “Management by
253. See Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 6–9; see also Sacha Darke
& Chris Garces, Surviving in the New Mass Carceral Zone, PRISON SERV. J. 2, 4, 6 (2017).
254. JULIE DE DARDEL, EXPORTER LA PRISON AMÉRICAINE: LE SYSTÈME CARCÉRAL
COLOMBIEN À L’ÈRE DU TOURNANT PUNITIVE (2016).
255. See supra Sec. III.
256. See supra Sec. IV.
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Dialogue” —we identify four types of administration of unmanageable prisons
found in Latin America. 257
While the advances achieved in the Peruvian Prison Reform Process should
be the baseline in any penitentiary anywhere in the world, the truth is that these
advances are not the norm in much of Latin America. To appreciate how
remarkable this achievement is, one need only consider the extraordinarily high
rates of overcrowding in the majority of detention centers in the region and the
levels of violence (attacks, deaths, suicides) in Latin American jails, prisons and
penitentiaries. 258 Further proof is found in the number or percentage of detention
centers whose de facto control rests in the hands of inmates, and often, in hands
of the most violent criminal organizations. 259 While the four proposed models,
both in the case of Peru and more generally in Latin America, are based on the
concrete reality of penal institutions in the region, we have sought to emphasize
a new management model, “Prison Governance,” based on the incorporation of
the representation of inmates in the operation of detention centers.
One may see that “Institutional Government” in prisons need not be in tension
with “Management by Dialogue.” Nor must one accept a false dichotomy
between security and treatment programs. Penitentiary officials need not choose
one or the other; instead, they should think of maximums and minimums, based
on the conditions present in any particular center. As we have underscored, these
models are not applicable to all penal institutions. The model of “Prison
Governance” may be applied to detention centers, which, from the general
perspective of prison administration, are ungovernable. 260 In certain conditions,
the “Prison Governance” approach can constitute a reasonable alternative that
may allow for the management of previously ungovernable centers. We note
here, that while there have been marked reductions in the levels of violence in
centers in which the Prison Governance Model has been applied, it has not been
possible to eliminate prison-on-prisoner violence entirely. Nor has it been
possible to eradicate trafficking in drugs and contraband or corruption by staff.
No doubt, the “Prison Governance” model implies a change in the mentality
of staff and the incorporation of inmates as actors in the peaceful management
of detention centers. The model also implies development of mutual confidence
and trust between and among prison staff and those deprived of liberty. It
requires patience. More than elaboration of norms, rules, or structures, this
governance model is based on “Management by Dialogue,” in which prison
administrators do not cede authority nor responsibility but rather act so as to
encourage others to assume co-responsibility for the operation of the penal
institution. The first step in this process is the recognition of inmates as human
beings with rights and responsibilities and the capacity to assist in achieving the
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
See Astrid Arrarás and Emily D. Bello-Pardo, supra note 31, at 6–9.
See infra Part B.
See infra Sec. IV.
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goals of the detention center. Next, the model requires the involvement of prison
staff, not only as security agents but also as agents of rehabilitation. “Prison
Governance” begins with a vision of penal institutions as centers of
rehabilitation and not punishment. As one of the core guiding principles of the
Peruvian Prison Reform Process stated, “if you treat inmates like prisoners, they
will respond like prisoners. If you treat them like people, they will respond like
people.” 261
The Peruvian experience has been studied by Postema, Cavallaro, and Nagra,
who consider the incorporation of the controlled organization of detainees and
the communication between detainees and authorities as central factors in the
improvement in conditions in penal institutions in Peru. 262 Further, those
authors have noted that the application of the practices identified in Peru in other
Latin American contexts (even in difficult centers) holds “the potential to
transform prisons into institutions that are less violent, less abusive, and thus
more rights-respecting and rehabilitative.” 263 This does not mean that all
problems have been resolved in centers like Lurigancho. However, the
successes are evident and provide hope for meaningful change in other
problematic detention centers in Latin America.
Finally, we close by observing that we do not propose “Prison Governance”
as an ideal model for the operation of detention centers but instead as a
provisional measure or intermediate approach. The ideal model would involve
detention centers at or below capacity with adequate, well-trained. and fairly
paid professional staff, as well as infrastructure designed for social reinsertion,
rather than the dehumanizing conditions one finds in many prisons in the
Americas. The ideal is the penal institution as a rehabilitative school, in which
the institutional authorities exercise control over the center, but in which they do
so with full respect for the basic rights of those deprived of liberty. As long as
we have penal institutions in Latin America with the characteristics that we see
today—extreme overcrowding, high levels of violence, unsanitary and deficient
infrastructure, and frequent control by violent gangs—management based on the
“Prison Governance” model offers the possibility of improving the daily lives of
detainees and prison staff. To move in this direction, detention center
administrators should incorporate rationally and progressively the voices of
those detained.

261. This guiding principle is one that co-author Pérez Guadalupe recalls repeating to staff of
INPE during his leadership of that body during the Reform Process.
262. Postema, Cavallaro & Nagra, supra note 14, at 61.
263. DE DARDEL, supra note 254; POSTEMA, CAVALLARO & NAGRA, supra note 14, at 62.
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VI. EPILOGUE: COVID-19 UNDOES YEARS OF PROGRESS
In early 2020, the coronavirus (COVID-19) ravaged countries and penal
systems across the globe. 264 Peru was no exception. 265 By early March 2020,
the country had registered its first case. 266 As with most everything else that
stood in its path, the nation’s prison and public health authorities, and by
extension, the Peruvian Prison Reform Process, were outmatched by COVID19. During March and April, analysts urged authorities in the penitentiary
system and in public health to take measures to respond to the impending
pandemic, both in general, but in particular, within closed, overcrowded
detention centers, due to the special risks they posed. 267 Little was done. 268
Officials took timid measures, underestimating the intensity of the virus and
mismanaging and misrepresenting the intensity of the crisis. 269 It did not take
long for them to lose control of detention centers as well as the response to the
broader national health crisis. 270
The unravelling began even before COVID-19 had taken its full, gruesome
toll on the prison system. While authorities downplayed the severe risks facing
overcrowded detention centers with poor hygienic conditions and insufficient
staff, detainees took matters into their own hands, instigating a series of protests
and incidents. 271 In northern Peru, on March 18, 2020, a full-blown riot took
264. Talha Burki, Prisons are in no way Equipped to Deal with Covid 19, THE LANCET (May
2, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30984-3/fulltext.
265. José Luis Pérez Guadalupe & Lucía Nuñovero Cisneros, Condenados a una Pena
Privativa de la Salud: La crisis carcelaria en tiempos del coronavirus, in PANDEMONIO 138 (2020).
266. Id. at 123.
267. Lucía Nuñovero Cisneros, La Pandemia de COVID-19 en las Cárceles Peruanas:
Prevenir el Desgobierno y la Mortalidad de Grupos Vulnerables, ENFOQUE, March 27, 2020.
https://www.enfoquederecho.com/2020/03/27/la-pandemia-de-covid-19-en-las-carceles-peruanasprevenir-el-desgobierno-y-la-mortalidad-de-grupos-vulnerables/; Personas Detenidas y sus
Familiares: (In)acciones Estatales ante el virus COVID-19 en los Países de Sudamérica,
Centroamérica y el Caribe, CLACSO, https://www.clacso.org/personas-detenidas-y-susfamiliares-inacciones-estatales-ante-el-virus-covid-19-en-los-paises-de-sudamericacentroamerica-y-el-caribe/; Por Una Nueva Convivencia: La Sociedad Peruana en Tiempos del
COVID-19, GRUPO TEMÁTICO DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES, https://www.clacso.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/Por-una-Nueva-Convivencia.pdf.
268. Serie Informes Especiales Nº 03-2020-DP/Situación de las Personas Privadas de
Libertad a Propósito de la Declaratoria de Emergencia Sanitaria, DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO (July
25,
2020),
https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Serie-de-InformesEspeciales-N%C2%BA-003-2020-DP.pdf
269. Ten days after the quarantine began in Peru, without having tested within detention
centers, Peruvian President Martín Vizcarra declared that there were no cases in prisons in the
country. DE DARDEL, supra note 254, at 5 (citing Revista Caretas (Mar. 24, 2020)).
270. The situation degraded quickly between April and May to the point that on 8 May the
CIDH launched a communication condemning violence in Peruvian prisons and urged the
government to adopt measures on behalf of life and integrity of inmates. CIDH Condena Hechos
de Violencia en Cárceles Peruanas, OEA, May 8, 2020 http://www.oas.org/es/
cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/107.asp.
271. Pérez Guadalupe & Nuñovero Cisneros, supra note 265, at 126, 131–32.
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hold in the Río Seco, Piura prison. 272 The next day, an incident followed in the
Picsi prison in Chiclayo that left two prison staff injured. On March 22, a clash
of detainees and an escape attempt resulted in three deaths at the El Milagro
prison in Trujillo. 273
The national government responded by dismissing the three top members of
the National Penitentiary Council (the President, Vice President, and a third
member), the body responsible for overseeing prisons in Peru. 274 While a visible
measure with political impact, the removal of those familiar with the system, its
organization, and the representation of detainees in different centers was not
wise. New leadership would assume control of a volatile situation in the midst
of the worst public health crisis in generations and without the benefit of
accumulated experience. The new INPE president, Gerson Villar, lasted only
six weeks at the helm of Peru’s prisons before being forced to resign. During
this brief period, over 1,000 inmates and hundreds of staff contracted COVID
and riots killed nine at the Castro Castro prison in one of many violent
incidents. 275
Not surprisingly, as COVID spread across Peru and in prisons, unrest
intensified within detention centers. New authorities lacked the personal
relationships and knowhow that might have allowed them to dialogue with those
deprived of liberty. The climate of communication and respect was gone,
replaced by hostility and mutual distrust. In just over a month, the internal
security and relative peace of the past decade within detention centers had
disappeared. By the end of April, there had been 15 disturbances and riots in
prisons in Peru, principally in the most overcrowded and thus most dangerous
centers. The worst incident was at the Castro Castro penitentiary in Lima on
April 27. That uprising claimed the lives of nine detainees and caused injury to
scores of others, including sixty staff and five police officers. Including those
killed in the Castro Castro riot, a total of thirteen people died in protests and riots
in Peru’s prisons by April 30. By that month’s end, there were 600 COVID
cases registered among those incarcerated, with fifteen deaths. 276 While
authorities took some measures to reduce overcrowding and relieve tensions, 277
these were insufficient to stop the spread of the disease or to quell unrest among
those incarcerated.

272. Serie Informes Especiales Nº 03-2020-DP/Situación de las Personas Privadas de
Libertad a Propósito de la Declaratoria de Emergencia Sanitaria, DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO (July
25, 2020), https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Serie-de-Informes-Espe
ciales-N%C2%BA-003-2020-DP.pdf.
273. See DE DARDEL, supra note 254.
274. Id. (noting the Decree (Resolución Suprema N° 058-2020-JUS) by which the three
authorities were relieved of their duties).
275. Id. at 26.
276. Id. at 8 (citing El País, (Apr. 28))
277. Id.
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By July, 300 of those incarcerated in Peru had died of COVID, as had 28
prison staff. 278 A process that had taken years of patient work had come undone.
The mutual confidence that had been established over years disintegrated in a
matter of days and weeks, as thousands of detainees and guards, locked in
overcrowded, diseased centers, fought for their lives using whatever means they
could. The practices and patterns of behavior developed over a decade could
not withstand the onslaught.
Much of what went wrong can and should be attributed to the mismanagement
of the authorities in power in early 2020. Unlike their predecessors, with the
notable exception in Lurigancho, explained below, they failed to consult with
those directly affected. They did not seek to govern collectively. Instead, they
underestimated COVID-19, made poor decisions, and failed to communicate
clearly what was being done.
Interestingly, Lurigancho, the center of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process,
served as an exception to the mismanagement that afflicted the broader prison
system. 279 When the crisis began, Lurigancho shared the same risk factors that
afflicted the system in general: overcrowding, understaffing, and resource
deprivation. 280 Indeed, on these measures, at roughly three times capacity, the
prison was in a more severe state than almost all other centers. Yet by all
measures, Lurigancho outperformed other prisons in managing COVID and
maintaining the peace. 281 The director and delegates worked together closely
from the beginning of the quarantine. They implemented isolation protocols,
purchased medicine and personal protective equipment, and worked through the
sanitary emergency in a coordinated fashion. 282 They took tests strategically
(only 300 of the 10,000 detainees) and controlled the outbreak, while
maintaining peace within the prison. 283 The levels of COVID infection in the
prison were no higher than among the non-incarcerated population. 284
In Peru, as in much of the world, the response to COVID-19 in detention
centers in 2020 was woefully deficient. In the United States—whose prisons
should not be considered ideal by any means, and that has had among the highest
per capita COVID rates in the world—levels of COVID infection were four
278. Pérez Guadalupe & Nuñovero Cisneros, supra note 265, at 152.
279. Penal de Lurigancho Continúa Acciones Preventivas Contra el COVID-19, GOB.PE (Feb.
7, 2021), https://www.gob.pe/institucion/inpe/noticias/341373-penal-de-lurigancho-continua-acc
iones-preventivas-contra-el-covid-19.
280. Lucía Nuñovero Cisneros, ¿Vacunar en las cárceles?, EL COMERCIO (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://elcomercio.pe/opinion/colaboradores/vacunar-en-las-carceles-por-lucia-nunoverovacunacion-carceles-penales-covid-19-noticia/?ref=ecr
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times higher in prisons than among the population in general. 285 To expect swift
and effective control of the pandemic inside Peru’s overcrowded and
underfunded prison system would not be reasonable. But the degree of
mismanagement was stark, particularly in comparison to the successes achieved
in the decade prior to the outbreak.
Had there been an intelligent, cooperative response (as in Lurigancho),
consistent with the animating principles of the Peruvian Prison Reform Process,
disaster might well have been averted. This article and the remarkable
experience in Peru in the years preceding the disaster of 2020 strongly suggest
that this is the case. But, as with so much about the coronavirus, we can only
imagine how the crisis might have been addressed more effectively had
intelligence and compassion carried the day.
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Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020, 12:35 PM),
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